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AUTHORS DISCUSS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MODERATOR: MARTIN AGRONSKY

GUESTS: Tad Szulc, author of Compulsive SpyDavid Weiss, author of The Politics of Lying
and The Invisible Government

MARTIN AGRONSKY: Good evening. For many Americans one of the most disturbing revelations of the Watergate scandal was the partisan political use of U. S. intelligence agencies that was demonstrated. When testimony to the Senate Watergate Committee uncovered the so-called Houston Plan to create a secret White House intelligence operation, Senator Sam Ervin had the name for it. He charged its White House authors with the same mentality as the Gestapo in Nazi Germany.

And now recent newspaper accounts report allegations that the CIA used E. Howard Hunt during the 1964 presidential campaign to gather information on Senator Goldwater, though so far it's been impossible to confirm that.

Well, tonight on Evening Edition a discussion of the Central Intelligence Agency--the CIA--with Tad Szulc, author of Compulsive Spy, a report on the career of E. Howard Hunt, one of the CIA's most ineffective agents, and David Weiss, author of two books: The Politics of Lying and The Invisible Government, which is a fascinating report on the Central Intelligence Agency itself.

Gentlemen, you've both devoted a lot of time to studying the activities and operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, and I wonder if we can begin by asking both of you whether or not you think we need a CIA? Do you, David?

DAVID WEISS: Well, I think we need to have an agency that gathers intelligence. We can call it anything we want. Whether we need to have an agency that overthrows governments, assassinates foreign leaders, engages in clandestine, covert operations, is another question. I think that ought to be either abolished or held to an absolute minimum, and so do a lot of other people.

AGRONSKY: Tad?

TAD SZULC: No question about it. In the kind of world in which we live, obviously we need an intelligence service. Technologically, for all the reasons of a nuclear age, for the situations about--very much as David said--I think it's an agency which should be much more controlled by the Congress, by the executive branch, so that it should not acquire a life of its own, as it has over the years.

AGRONSKY: Don't you feel that you have sort of a built-in paradox in a democratic system to have a covert agency operating, as the CIA does, without any Congressional oversight--without any supervision, as it were--oversight can be misunderstood--any supervision?

WEISS: Well, obviously the whole idea of democracy is open, and people being informed of the decisions the government is taking. The whole concept of an intelligence service is secret, so that intelligence and democracy are antithetical. It has always been a tremendous problem of where do you fit an intelligence service into a democracy?

AGRONSKY: I think of the classic case--you remember in the first hundred days of the Kennedy administration--when we had the Bay of Pigs, and President Kennedy came before the American people afterwards and confessed--said flatly--that he had been misled--that he'd made a mistake in judgment in going ahead with the Bay of Pigs. And that was clearly the result of a wrong evaluation by secret agencies of the government--the CIA in this instance--I suppose the National Security Agency was involved--the Defense Intelligence Service was involved. How do we know what they're doing?

SZULC: Well, you know, it's--I think the point that you're making is a very valid one, and I think it's aggravated or compounded by the fact that the people do not seem to learn, to wit: you quoted President Kennedy, who said this to me on one occasion after the Bay of Pigs. I remember late in '61, when I was researching for a book on the Bay of Pigs, I went to see Dick Bissell, who at the time was deputy director of the CIA, and the man directly responsible for the Bay of Pigs. And after a very long conversation, I said, Dick, what is the lesson--what is the, you know--what have you learned from this fiasco? And he said, thoughtful and very serious, I tell you, we have learned--at least I have learned--that you cannot try to run this kind of operation--as the Bay of Pigs--in an open society. And therefore this is a contradiction with which we either go on living, or we will find a solution.

Now, we are 12 years later--all these things we're discussing here--you know, the Agency, Watergate--I guess the lesson has not been learned.

AGRONSKY: It's not been learned.

SZULC: Of this contradiction to which David referred, and--

AGRONSKY: Well, that's what I find fascinating in your book, really, Tad--you know, Compulsive Spy, which you write about this E. Howard Hunt. Now, to begin with, I'd like to ask you why did you pick E. Howard Hunt? Strikes me as rather ineffectual--CIA agent, if you want to evaluate him in that sense. Why did you think he was important enough to write about? What is he--what are you trying to say when you pick him?

SZULC: Oh, I guess the answer is--the short answer, Martin--is that as the story began to develop in '72, Hunt became, at least in my eyes, a symbol, if you will, of the whole mentality of the Cold War--mentality of that which was in this Watergate--that he represented through his career, his service with the Agency, the kind of mentality which finally climaxed in the Houston Plan, which you mentioned, and all the operations which followed. I did not write it because Howard Hunt is a fascinating subject for biography. He is not. To me he was a vehicle, if you will--a tool--with which I tried, at least to my own satisfaction--to try to understand what has led people in this government--people with intelligence experience--to this kind of a domestic intelligence morass which this was. So my interest in Hunt as Hunt is sort of ancillary--is what he would present and how he was made to fit into this.

AGRONSKY: Well, Tad, what you don't do in the book--and what I'd like you to address yourself to now--is to tell me whether you regard Hunt as a kind of prototype of the sort of people that work still, if you like, for the CIA? The kind of people that we recruit for the intelligence community.

SZULC: I suppose the answer is up to a point a generational answer. I would imagine that there are people of the Hunt generation--people, you know, who went through OSS, World War II--the Cold War period--I would say from what I have seen and heard from Hunt's superiors and other people that Hunt was not atypical of this kind of personality. Whether the people who are being recruited today--you know, people in their 20's--whether they are different, I'm not sure I can intelligently say. But he was the product of Cold War intelligence operation. I think in that sense, it's relevant. Does that answer you?

AGRONSKY: Well, it does in a way, but I--let me put it this way. The picture that so many of us have of the CIA until a fellow like Hunt services--surfaces--or until a sort of a mechanic type like McCord--surfaces--in the course of the Watergate hearings. You get a picture of people who are either expert in languages, who have some very special skill that enables them to make evaluations of scientific developments. You get people who are well rounded, who are intelligent people. What emerges with an E. Howard Hunt is not a particularly intelligent man, and that makes you wonder about the whole makeup of the CIA--their approach to recruitment, the kind of people who run the Agency--what are they like?

WEISS: Well, I think you have to realize, Martin, that we're talking about two different sides of the Central Intelligence Agency. There's the intelligence side--the people who study the railroad timetables from Minsk to Pinsk, and the scientists you talk about--the language experts. Then there's the covert side, known now as the Directorate of Operations. It used to be called the Plans Directorate, and it's also known as the clandestine service--

AGRONSKY: It might more crudely be called the Department of Dirty Tricks--

WEISS: Or spies--

AGRONSKY: The black side--

WEISS: The black side--or the spies--black in the sense of covert, or secret. Now, Howard Hunt came from that side, and

these are the people who overthrow governments, break into offices, and so on. It's very different from the people you might meet who say they work for CIA, and they're economists, for example. It's completely different.

SZULC: Well, in my experience over the years, when I was a correspondent, taking this division which David has set out, I have met some analysts, thinkers, and Agency who are strongly brilliant people--who have, you know, double, triple Ph.D.s in African studies, China--you name it--and they're very, very impressive intellectually. Then you get into this very peculiar, odd, covert side, and there you find a man like Howard Hunt, who, as you pointed out, is not a specialist at anything. You know, he couldn't fly a U-2 airplane, he could not presumably code or decode things. He was essentially a political manipulator, within the context of covert operations.. He tried to manipulate, you know, Cubans--Cuban exiles during the Bay of Pigs. He tried to manipulate people during the Guatemalan thing, and in '72 he tried to manipulate people into contacts about the Watergate. So he was essentially a covert, political manipulator--a man without any special skill who sort of tried to swim in that murky current of the little things, you know.

AGRONSKY: Well, he turns up, and we see him operating as he did in Watergate. And one wonders who else from the CIA operates in domestic politics? Now we have the story, for example, it's still not authenticated--that Hunt himself is supposed to have worked for President Johnson, or worked on behalf of President Johnson, in '64, to get information about Senator Goldwater. Now we can't prove that. Did he, indeed? Do you know?

WEISS: Martin, the facts on that are very unclear--

SZULC: I never heard it.

WEISS: --but it seems very doubtful to me. And the second story that came out on that subject last week said that all Hunt had done, apparently, was pick up a press release from the Goldwater headquarters, and deliver it to the White House. Which sounds quite different from breaking into opposition headquarters, or breaking into--

AGRONSKY: Well, let me ask you this. From your knowledge of the CIA operations--both of you have very considerable expertise in this area--do you think that before this administration the CIA was involved in domestic political intelligence operations in this country?

WEISS: I think there's no question of it. I have written that the CIA established about 1964 a domestic operations division, which was housed at 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, which is one block from the White House. It's illegal and unconstitutional, both.

SZULC: Under the statute, it is.

AGRONSKY: Then--what did they do?

WEISS: They were involved in a variety of activities in this country. Now, you recall in 1967, it came out that the National Student Association had been subsidized by the CIA, and that hundreds of foundations were serving the CIA cover--that they were channeling money into a wide variety of educational, religious, labor, organizations in this country and abroad. I've written in my book that they were training Tibetan guerillas in Colorado, ten thousand feet up in the Rocky Mountains, about 12

years ago. This was an activity which could be argued was directed at infiltrating men into Tibet, but it was going on in Colorado. I don't think that the Congress had in mind that this sort of activity would be happening, any more than Watergate, when they set up the CIA.

SZULC: I think the terribly difficult problem is, as David points out, is how do you define it? Under the statute of 1947--the statute which established the Agency--their territory--their jurisdiction--is outside of the United States. Nevertheless, headquarters is here in Washington--outside of Washington. There are offices in New York, in Miami and San Francisco, and Charleston, South Carolina. What do they do? The office in Miami has over the years been involved in Cuban type adventures. Is it domestic or is it foreign? Well, I guess it's both, because it works out of U. S. territory, recruiting people simply to work for them.

David was referring to the foundations, where there was a major New York publishing house which was to a large extent subsidized by the Agency in the '60's.

WEISS: We're talking about Frederick Prager, which--

SZULC: We're talking about Frederick Prager, yes.

WEISS: --published 15 books on behalf of--at the request of the CIA.

AGRONSKY: Well, now we're talking, too, about an admission by the present director of the CIA that they do, indeed, subsidize something like 30 American correspondents abroad--not full-time correspondents--string correspondents, not staff correspondents, but you know, guys who work as journalists abroad--American citizens--who function as CIA agents. Which really, for any of us--we've all worked abroad as foreign correspondents. That makes us suspect in the eyes of our foreign colleagues wherever we go--

WEISS: Suspect without getting the additional income--

AGRONSKY: Yeah. And we're not involved in any way.

WEISS: That's right, but some have been, and that's--they now claim that's being phased out, but one of the problems is you don't know whether it's being phased out.

AGRONSKY: That's it--the problem--how do you know? Now that's the ultimate point. How do we know what the CIA's doing now? We know, from the testimony that came out of the Watergate Committee of the Houston Plan. We know that the Houston Plan was designed to establish a kind of a central, secret--

WEISS: Super-intelligence agency.

AGRONSKY: --super-intelligence agency which was under no one's supervision at all, aside from that of the President of the United States, apparently, and we know that nobody objected to it in the end but J. Edgar Hoover. We know even by the admission of the President, I believe, that it was put into operation in something like five days.

WEISS: Well, now, it was put into operation. He claims it was rescinded after five days, but there's no evidence that it was ever rescinded..

AGRONSKY: We don't know that.

WEISS: There's no documentation of that. It may have been. But I think what's interesting here--

AGRONSKY: Isn't it extraordinary that we sit here and we talk about this thing, and all of us admit we don't know?

SZULC: Well, Martin, there are committees in the Congress which are charged with oversights over the Agency. There are several committees in the Senate and the House. I think the record will show no sentences. The questions asked are enormously polite and superficial. I'm not sure--

AGRONSKY: Nobody questions how they do their--

SZULC: Nobody questions.

WEISS: Senator Symington, who has a love-hate relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency, said that the committee that Senator Stennis headed in the Senate, supposed to watch what CIA is doing, hadn't met for a whole year. So that their supervision could not have been very extensive.

SZULC: You know, as you all remember, year after year, this pattern is found, we must establish some joint committee like the one looking after the Atomic Energy Commission--it's never been done. Senator Mansfield, as I recall, tried. Fulbright tried it over the years. And even with the Bay of Pigs and the events of the '60's and the Indo-China situation and the Watergate, still the Agency is not subject to the kind of control which I think is vital in an open society, that every other branch of government is, you know. Even your spending--

WEISS: Except the White House, as we've now discovered.

SZULC: As we now discover, the White House.

AGRONSKY: Beyond that, we know another thing. The Director of the CIA serves, in effect, at the pleasure of the President. Now, it requires a man of considerable resolution and courage to resist presidential pressure if the President wishes to use the CIA wrongfully. What protection have we got about that?

WEISS: Well, one of the interesting things is that during the Watergate investigation last summer, it was brought out that Haldeman and Ehrlichman, at the direction of the President, asked Dick Helms, who was then head of CIA, to tell the then head of the FBI, Pat Gray--it's hard to keep this cast of characters straight--to lay off, in effect, on the investigation of Watergate, because it might perhaps jeopardize CIA activities in Mexico. Now, for a while it seemed as though there was a good public relations job done for the Agency that they had refused to do this, but--in fact, General Walters, who is the deputy director of CIA, went over the same day he was told to do so by the White House, and he told Pat Gray, now you'd better lay off, because you haven't jeopardized any of our operations yet, but maybe you will if you keep going. And it wasn't for some days thereafter that things got a little too hot. General Walters decided maybe he'd better tell Pat Gray that there really was no national security--they could go ahead and investigate. And the memo has more recently surfaced from Director Helms along the same lines, so that in fact, the CIA apparently did ask the FBI to hold back on the investigation.

AGRONSKY: Well, we know this about Hunt, too, for example, that the CIA provided him with his disguises, with false papers, with a camera--

WEISS: Don't forget the red wig.

AGRONSKY: --The red wig--

SZULC: Helms claims it was a blonde wig, by the way.

AGRONSKY: But you see--

SZULC: Sure, and now we know that in addition to this, the agency in Miami--the Miami office, provided false papers for the Cuban-Americans. It was much more of an involvement than the testimony before the Senate shows.

AGRONSKY: Well, Martinez--

SZULC: Was on a retainer.

AGRONSKY: --He was on a retainer from the CIA--

SZULC: That's right.

AGRONSKY: --One of the Cubans who was caught in the initial Watergate break-in. Now, I don't know--how plausible is it that the CIA didn't know what he was up to, or didn't know what Hunt was up to?

SZULC: Well, I find it very hard to believe--this is a matter of common sense, Martin--that an agency which has a professional, I suppose, jealousy of its own prerogatives, would not ask itself--that Dick Helms or General Cushman or whoever was there, wouldn't ask himself why are we being asked by Ehrlichman and the White House to provide this logistic support, and simply forget about it for a year or so, knowing that Hunt was a retired middle-level official of the agency, that people involved with Hunt were former Cuban employees of the agency--

WEISS: The same wonderful folks who brought you the Bay of Pigs.

SZULC: Exactly, precisely the same wonderful folks who did that, and the--I can't believe that the people sitting on the seventh floor at Langley simply would show no interest--why is the White House turning to us for resources? It doesn't make sense.

WEISS: But there's an important point here, Martin.

AGRONSKY: What is it?

WEISS: Well, the thing is this--you have to break down the question. The same people who broke into the psychiatrist's office in Los Angeles, of Daniel Ellsberg, in 1971--the so-called plumbers--the identical people, with one exception, broke into the office of the Democratic National Committee, so you have the same set of plumbers. Now, the CIA help was given to the plumbers in connection with the first break-in in 1971, of Ellsberg's doctor's office. It's very interesting that the same group of men who were involved in so-called national security investigations with CIA help, under White House orders, were the identical ones, who supposedly, without any CIA involvement, or White House orders, broke into the Watergate. They're the same people.

SZULC: With the same documents provided to them by the time of the Los Angeles break-in of December, '71.

AGRONSKY: Are we then forced as, then, you know, American citizens, to say that there does exist in this country a secret agency which is not susceptible to supervision by the

Congress of the United States, which in no way has to worry about having its funding overseen by the Congress of the United States, which is not accountable to anybody really, but apparently the President of the United States--

SZULC: If he so chooses.

AGRONSKY: If he so chooses.

WEISS: Well, some of that is correct, as to the-- you know, there's some supervision of the budget, but what I think is perhaps more important than to try to--

AGRONSKY: There's no supervision of covert activities, none.

WEISS: No, but of the overall budget, there is, and the supervision of covert activities gets into a whole complicated thing of an interagency committee that's supposed to be watching it, called the Forty Committee, which is itself highly secret, which used to be called by other names. Now, what I think is really important here is that if you set up a secret agency, which was done in 1947 by the Congress of the United States, and you create this tremendous power with a budget that is largely secret, within a certain framework, and you set up an intelligence structure that spends billions of dollars a year, sooner or later, these techniques are going to be applied to our domestic politics. I think is what a big part of what Watergate represents. It's going to be a spillover--

AGRONSKY: Well, this is a demonstration that they have indeed been applied.

WEISS: Yes, not necessarily under the direction of the head of the CIA, but the same kinds of people--these were ex-CIA people, with one exception--Martinez--

AGRONSKY: What's the difference?

WEISS: --the same mentality--

AGRONSKY: These people come from the CIA, and those who run the CIA chose to turn a blind eye on their activities.

SZULC: And they're responsive to such requests as the White House has made in the past and might make again. I would find it difficult to see a single CIA official saying no to the White House on a given request, a given proposal, so maybe the danger does exist, and Watergate has proved that.

AGRONSKY: What is the answer, then? Suppose that you had the Job, David, of suggesting to a couple of responsible Congressmen who really had the authority to do something about it, what they could do to remove this threat of the external, unaccountable activities of the CIA in domestic politics.

WEISS: Well, it goes so deep that I can't answer it in the two minutes remaining, but very briefly, one thing certainly that could be done, since you said, what would I tell Congress, I would tell Congress to establish an open, visible, instead of invisible committee, or joint committee, such as they have in the field of atomic energy, which deals with very highly secret matters, to supervise the intelligence community, instead of these vague, shadowy committees that seem to operate out of Senator Stennis' vest pocket, and it was the late Senator Russell, I think, who said, I don't hear about these things--these secret

activities--he was supposed to be in charge of hearing about them. So, that would be the first step.

AGRONSKY: You come back to what you always have to come back to, in a democracy. You must provide for accountability or none of it will work responsibly.

SZULC: That's right. That's exactly what Watergate established for us.

AGRONSKY: Well, thank you very much, gentlemen.

WASHINGTON POST
20 December 1973

Hunt Tells Senate Panel He Spied On Goldwater in '64 on LBJ Order

By Lawrence Meyer
and John Harran

Washington Post Staff Writers

Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. has told the staff of the Senate select Watergate committee that he conducted surveillance of Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) during the 1964 Presidential campaign at the order of President Lyndon B. Johnson, according to informed sources.

The exact nature and duration of Hunt's activities were not revealed, but Goldwater, an amateur dabbler in electronics, said yesterday that he had no indication that the surveillance involved electronic eavesdropping.

Another source said that Hunt was not certain of the dates of the surveillance, although he told the committee staff it began well before Goldwater's presidential nomination at the 1964 Republican Convention and lasted until after his overwhelming election defeat that November.

Hunt said he undertook the surveillance with a team of operatives, under directions from Mr. Johnson through an intermediary, according to the source, who declined to say who Hunt named as the intermediary.

Goldwater, who declined to give the source of his information, said he had been told in the past two or three days that Hunt and a team that "could have been as many as 30 people not just working on me but working on other people, too" operated out of offices in "downtown" Washington. Although Goldwater said he could not be certain of the group's name, he thought it was "domestic investigations." Goldwater said he did not know the names of

the other people under surveillance.

Goldwater said he had the impression that Hunt and the others involved in the operation were "on leave" from the CIA (where Hunt was supposed to be working at the time). "If I had to guess, I would guess that they didn't want it traced back to the CIA," Goldwater said.

"I knew 10 years ago what was going on," Goldwater said, asserting that friends in the CIA and the FBI had told him then that he was under surveillance by both agencies. Goldwater said he had "no idea" what the investigation involved since he had no indication that it delved into his private life, financial affairs, "home life or anything like that." Goldwater said he learned only two or three days ago of Hunt's professed involvement. "I don't even know the man," Goldwater said.

Attempts were made last night to reach several aides to President Johnson in 1964, but only two could be reached.

Lawrence F. O'Brien, a White House aide in 1964 and later chairman of the Democratic National Committee, said he had never heard of Hunt at the time and, "Honestly, I never heard of such a thing," he added, referring to Hunt's reported testimony.

Horace Busby, a special assistant to the President at the time, said that Hunt's testimony "strikes me as preposterous on its face ... While I thoroughly disbelieve it, I don't want to dispute the man on the basis of information I don't have," Busby said. Busby said he knew of no connection be-

tween Hunt and President Johnson or the White House in 1964. "I find it incredible that Mr. Johnson would have any need of surveillance of Sen. Goldwater," Busby said.

At the time, Goldwater said, "I just assumed it was one man or two men assigned at the direction of the President. . . . It never bothered me. I never got upset about it. Oh, I guess it should have, but knowing Johnson as I did, I never got upset about it.

"I would naturally be concerned to learn what they did find out," Goldwater added, "not that I did anything wrong." Goldwater said he would like to know if Hunt kept a dossier on him, "But the fellow wouldn't tell me."

Goldwater said he did not press his source of the information for details. "I didn't want to get too involved in it," Goldwater said. "I figured sooner or later it would come out."

Goldwater had said last April, "I was bugged by the other side and paid no attention to it." Yesterday, however, Goldwater said, "I never found my place bugged and I know something about that because I'm an electronics expert."

At the same time, Goldwater said of President Johnson, "I knew that he had espionage. He had to have. For a long time I thought it was within my staff." Goldwater said that the Democrats "seemed to have my speeches before I had them" during the 1964 campaign.

A spokesman for CIA Director William E. Colby also said yesterday that Colby had "no comment" on Hunt's reported testimony. A spokes-

man for the FBI said he "categorically denied" Goldwater's assertion that the FBI was involved in any surveillance of him in 1964.

Hunt's appearance before the Senate Watergate committee's staff was part of an ongoing investigation by the Republican staff members of the possible role of the CIA in the Watergate affair. The committee's vice chairman, Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.), has been directing this inquiry for several months.

A source close to Hunt said yesterday that Hunt met Monday with Baker and on Tuesday with other members of the minority staff, and will probably meet with them again next week. In all of the committee discussions with Hunt to date—some informal, some with Hunt under oath—the main topic has been CIA domestic operations, the source said.

Baker appears to have collected a large number of allegations relating to CIA involvement in domestic matters, the source said, and Hunt is providing information about some of these activities.

Hunt, currently serving a sentence of 2½ to eight years in prison for his role in the break-in and bugging of the Democratic National Committee's Watergate headquarters at the Allenwood (Pa.) Prison Camp, has been accompanied to his meetings with Baker and the Senate committee's minority staff by one of his attorneys, William A. Snyder of Baltimore. Snyder declined yesterday to comment on the meetings.

Another of Hunt's attorneys, C. Dickerman Williams, who said he has not been present for the meetings with Hunt, confirmed that Baker and minority counsel Fred Thompson were quizzing Hunt about "CIA domestic activities," but said he could provide no other details.

Baker's inquiry into CIA

Hunt's Role in 1964 Minor, Hill Unit Told

Domestic activities beyond the 1972 presidential campaign appears to be outside the scope of the Senate resolution establishing the Senate select Watergate committee. That resolution authorized the committee to "conduct an investigation and study of the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any persons, acting individually or in combination with others, in the presidential election of 1972, or any campaign, canvass, or other activity related to it."

Although an attempt was made on the Senate floor on Feb. 7 to enlarge the committee's scope to include the 1964 and 1968 presidential elections, the proposed amendment was defeated.

One source close to the Senate committee said yesterday that despite the resolution's limitation of the investigation to the 1972 campaign, the argument could be made that the 1964 campaign activities are relevant to show a precedent for the 1972 bugging. In any case, this source said, it would be politically awkward for committee chairman Sen. Sam J. Ervin (D-N.C.) to bar an attempt by Baker to put on Hunt's testimony if Baker decides to do so.

Conservative columnist and editor William F. Buckley Jr. has in recent weeks assumed a major role in the handling of Hunt's defense. Buckley has obtained the free services of Williams, a lawyer highly regarded in conservative circles. Assisting Williams is Snyder, who will receive a fee, Williams said.

Williams and Snyder, who are handling Hunt's appeal, succeed Sidney S. Sacha, a Washington lawyer who has served as Hunt's attorney only since last summer. Sacha replaced William O. Bittman who came under investigation for his handling of payments that some Watergate witnesses said were designed to buy the silence of the original seven Watergate defendants.

Both Sacha and Williams recently told The Post that Buckley is in charge of the defense. Williams, 73, a partner in the New York law firm of Baker, Nelson and Williams, has long been the attorney for Buckley and his magazine, National Review. He said he has agreed to serve without fee as a favor to his old friend, Buckley, and because he feels Hunt "has been done a very great injustice."

Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt's alleged "surveillance" of Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) during the 1964 presidential campaign consisted of having a secretary pick up press releases, speeches, travel schedules and other materials at Republican headquarters, according to reliable accounts of Hunt's secret testimony to the Senate select Watergate committee.

Although Hunt's activities carried out while he was a CIA agent, were originally described to The Washington Post as being a "surveillance" operation of Goldwater on orders from then President Lyndon B. Johnson, the source of that information declined initially to provide any details.

Yesterday, the same source, who cannot be identified under a promise of confidentiality, acknowledged when questioned again that Hunt had described a pick-up operation from Goldwater headquarters to the Watergate committee staff and had provided few details.

The source also denied saying that President Johnson had initiated the order for the operation.

According to reliable accounts, Hunt testified to the committee staff that the speeches and press releases were delivered to Chester L. Cooper, a White House aide to President Johnson who worked on foreign policy matters.

Cooper last night denied any knowledge of a CIA "surveillance" of Sen. Goldwater during the time he was the Republican nominee for President.

"I knew that we were getting Goldwater's speeches . . . the stuff that was going to the press," Cooper said. "How the hell it got there, I don't know." Cooper said he "never had the pleasure" of meeting Hunt.

Hunt was questioned primarily by the Republican minority staff. Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.), the vice-chairman, has expressed a continuing interest in the possible role of the CIA in the Watergate affair.

Baker said last night, "I have no present plans to pursue this line of inquiry." According to a source close to Hunt, the main topic of discussion between the minority staff and Hunt has been CIA domestic operations.

Baker acknowledged that such inquiries, unless related to the Watergate affair, are beyond the scope of the select committee's mandate from the Senate. "There's no jurisdiction unless you stretch the point," Baker said.

Elizabeth McIntosh, a former CIA employee who worked with Hunt in a downtown Washington office in 1964, said yesterday that she understood that Goldwater speeches were not delivered to the White House but instead were delivered to CIA headquarters in Langley, Va.

"It was just to keep in touch with what was going on," Mrs. McIntosh said. "If it had anything to do with the White House, I'm sure he (Hunt) would have told us. He would have bragged about it."

She said that Hunt was part of a CIA cover office at 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue that consisted of 10 or 12 employees who maintained contact with publishers who were assisting the CIA. Hunt told the committee staff that he worked for a CIA branch called the Domestic Operations Division which was set up in the early 1960s.

Hunt told the committee staff that the actual pick-up was done by a secretary named Connie Hicks. Miss Hicks, who is now married and is Mrs. Mazerov, of State College, Pa., said last night in a telephone interview that she did perform courier work when she worked for the CIA, but that she could not recall picking up any materials from Goldwater headquarters. She said she had never taken anything she picked up to the White House or the Executive Office Building.

"I might have picked it up from someone else, like in a hotel room," she said. When asked if she recalled a daily pick-up from any person in the same place during the period of the campaign, she said she did not.

Referring to Hunt's reported testimony on her role, Miss Hicks said, "I'm sure he wouldn't have said I had done something if I hadn't . . . I consider him to be a man of great integrity."

Hunt reportedly told the committee staff that immediately after Goldwater was nominated in 1964, he was told to pick up all publicly released information at Goldwater headquarters

and take it to the White House to Cooper. Hunt reportedly said that he rejected, as a Goldwater Republican, but was told to do it anyway.

Goldwater said on Wednesday that he knew of Hunt's testimony, although not in detail. Goldwater said that he had no indication that the "surveillance" discussed by Hunt involved bugging, or any investigation into his private, financial or domestic affairs.

Another committee source said that Hunt had not indicated that wiretapping or eavesdropping was used, or that the "surveillance" involved anything more than the pick-up operation from Goldwater headquarters. At least two sources said that Hunt "volunteered" the information without being prodded to discuss it.

According to a committee source, Hunt provided little detail about the operation except that it involved "press releases, travel schedules, that sort of thing." This source said Hunt testified he was also suppose to get "other information" but that Hunt gave no details as to what it was or how it was to be obtained.

Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich.), chairman of the House Armed Services Intelligence subcommittee, said yesterday that he had asked the CIA for any information on Hunt's activities as described in his secret testimony before the Watergate committee.

Nedzi, who said he was "dubious" of the testimony as reported in Wednesday editions of The Washington Post, said that the CIA was searching its files for information. From early indications, Nedzi said, "There is no one in a position of authority who can substantiate the story."

WASHINGTON POST

9 JAN 1974

U.S. Envoy Called Agent for CIA

Buenos Aires, Jan. 8 (AP) — The new U.S. ambassador to Argentina, who has yet to arrive at his post, was accused today of being a member of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Robert C. Hill was named ambassador by President Nixon last December, to replace John Davis Lodge, who resigned. El Descamisado, a weekly news magazine linked to the leftist faction of the ruling Peronist movement, made the charge.

WASHINGTON STAR
21 December 1973

Hunt Spying Story Disputed

By Martha Angle
Star-News Staff Writer

Former CIA Director John A. McCone has expressed surprise and skepticism at reports that E. Howard Hunt Jr. directed a spying operation on Sen. Barry Goldwater in 1964 on orders from his CIA superiors.

Doubts about the report were also voiced by Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi D-Mich., chairman of a CIA oversight committee in Congress which last summer conducted exhaustive hearings into the agency's possible relationship with political spying in the Watergate case.

Agency officials conducted a quick check of their files yesterday, Nedzi said, and came up with "nothing to substantiate this kind of statement." Nedzi said the CIA has promised a complete search of its files on Hunt and a further report to him as soon as possible.

McCone, who headed the Central Intelligence Agency

from November 1961 to April 1963, said in a telephone interview yesterday that he had "never heard of any such thing either directly or indirectly."

ACCORDING to informed sources, Hunt, who is now serving a prison term for his role in the Watergate break-in and bugging, has told Republican investigators for the special Senate Watergate committee that he sent two operatives to Goldwater's Washington headquarters during the 1964 presidential campaign to "see what was going on."

He did so on orders from his CIA superiors, one of whom — according to at least one published report — was stationed at the White House, Hunt allegedly told committee investigators.

Senate sources said Hunt told them his operatives brought back advance campaign schedules, news releases and "any other information they could obtain."

Goldwater said yesterday he was informed by unidentified persons "either just before or just after the end of the campaign that both the FBI and the CIA had me under surveillance."

McCone, now a senior executive in Los Angeles for the International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., insisted that the CIA had "absolutely no involvement whatsoever" in domestic politics during his tenure as director.

He expressed strong doubt that President Johnson or anyone on his White House staff could have ordered the alleged CIA spying on Goldwater.

NEDZI said that yesterday's quick search of files did produce evidence that Hunt was on medical leave from the agency during the latter part of 1964 — both before and after the election campaign.

The files apparently show Hunt was hospitalized from

Dec. 1 to Dec. 14 and that he was granted leave until Dec. 5. CIA officials asserted Nedzi that the Hunt file contains materials, such as x-rays and medical reports, to substantiate that the leave of absence really was for a medical purpose.

Nedzi's subcommittee compiled some 770 pages of testimony from Hunt during a nine-hour period of interrogation last June, at a time when Hunt was still under threat of a 35-year prison sentence, and, Nedzi recalls, "appeared to desire to reveal everything."

The testimony, which has not been released and is still classified, makes no reference to any political espionage activity in 1964, Nedzi said, even though Hunt volunteered page after page of narrative reminiscence about his past career.

Hunt was not, however, asked specifically about any domestic spying in the 1964 campaign, Nedzi said.

NEW YORK TIMES
21 December 1973

Hunt Said to Tell Investigators He Spied on Goldwater in 1964

By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 20.—E. Howard Hunt Jr., now in jail for coordinating the Watergate burglary, has told Senate Republican investigators that he gathered material on Senator Barry Goldwater's 1964 Presidential campaign and passed it on to an official of the Johnson Administration, according to sources in the Senate Watergate committee.

During the campaign between Mr. Goldwater and President Johnson, Mr. Hunt was an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Hunt told Senator Howard Baker Jr. and members of his staff this week, according to the committee sources, that he acted as an intermediary for persons who picked up campaign literature, speeches, press releases and travel schedules from Mr. Goldwater's office.

Mr. Hunt reportedly said that he had operated under orders from a superior and had turned the material over to the superior. The sources would not disclose the name of the superior and would not say whether he was in the intelligence agency.

Senator Baker, the ranking Republican on the Watergate

committee, has been investigating the possibility that the agency was more deeply involved than heretofore known in the break-in last year at the Democratic headquarters in the Watergate complex.

The interview with Mr. Hunt reportedly was conducted in Senator Baker's office. Mr. Hunt was not under oath at the time.

Senator Baker was said not to be planning to bring the matter up in public hearings next year because the committee's jurisdiction involves only the 1972 Presidential race.

Democratic members of the committee staff, who were told of Mr. Hunt's allegations after his session with Senator Baker, said today that they were skeptical about the story.

They noted that Mr. Hunt was exhaustively questioned before his public testimony last September and that he never mentioned gathering information about Mr. Goldwater.

Moreover, there were indications that Mr. Hunt never told the story to either of his first two lawyers in the Watergate case, William O. Bittman and Sidney H. Sachs, and that he almost certainly had not mentioned the matter to the spe-

cial Watergate prosecutor. Mr. Hunt was accompanied to the Baker interview by a new attorney, William A. Snyder of Baltimore, who would not answer questions today about what had been said at the interview.

Mr. Hunt now has still another attorney, C. Dickerman Williams. William F. Buckley Jr., the columnist, who is a friend of Mr. Hunt, arranged for Mr. Williams to represent him.

A spokesman for the C.I.A., which is prohibited by law from involving itself in domestic intelligence, said that the agency would have "no comment" on Mr. Hunt's reported allegations. Throughout the Watergate investigation, the agency has refused public responses to all inquiries.

Termed 'Out of Character'

Democratic officials who were connected with Mr. Johnson's 1964 campaign said that they had not heard of Mr. Hunt then and knew nothing about his purported intelligence-gathering operation.

Tad Szulc, a journalist who recently completed a book about Mr. Hunt, "Compulsive Spy," said today that he knew nothing about Mr. Hunt's working against Mr. Goldwater, but he said that had Mr. Hunt done so it would have been "car-

pletely out of character."

Mr. Hunt, he said, "had an obsessive right-wing thing" and probably would not have done work that might have harmed Mr. Goldwater, who was considered more conservative than Mr. Johnson.

Mr. Szulc said that in 1964 Mr. Hunt was a full-time employee of the intelligence agency and was officially based in Madrid but that he spent a good deal of time in Washington.

Mr. Hunt's reported allegation is the second that has been received by Senate investigators about efforts of Mr. Johnson's aides to obtain information about Mr. Goldwater.

Earlier, according to a committee source, the panel obtained evidence that in the 1964 campaign the Federal Bureau of Investigation complied with a White House request for its file on Senator Goldwater.

Mr. Goldwater refused to be interviewed today. He previously said that he believed the Johnson campaign spied on him in 1964 and might have used a telephone.

Mr. Hunt, who is now serving a term of 30 months to eight years in the Federal penitentiary at Allenwood, Pa., reportedly told the Senate investigators that no electronic surveillance or burglary was involved in his 1964 operation.

Court Frees Hunt, Barker for Appeals

By Eugene L. Meyer
Washington Post Staff Writer

The U.S. Court of Appeals yesterday released convicted Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt and burglar Bernard L. Barker on personal bond pending the outcome of their appeals for a new trial.

In brief orders signed by clerk Hugh E. Kline, the appeals court ordered the men to report to the probation office of the U.S. District Court here to surrender to the U.S. marshal for the District "when properly called upon to do so" and to notify officials of changes of addresses or phone numbers.

Hunt is the former White House aide sentenced on November to serve 2 1/2 years for his role in the burglary and wiretapping of Democratic national headquarters at the Watergate. He was ordered to maintain his residence at 11120 River Rd., Potomac, Md.

Barker, a Miami resident who recruited three other Miami men for the Watergate bugging, was sentenced to serve 18 months to six years and stands to be eligible for parole in June. He was ordered to stay with his wife at their Miami residence.

Daniel Schultz, lawyer for Barker and the three other Cuban-Americans, said all

four are being held in the federal penitentiary at Eglin Field, Fla. Schultz said he requested a delayed decision on motions for release pending appeal by the other three men because they are eligible for parole Jan. 7.

Intertwined with the legal actions yesterday was the family situation of Hunt, whose wife died in a plane crash Dec. 8, 1972, leaving four children to be reared by a father who was sentenced to prison last March 22.

"His family has just deteriorated so drastically they need some adult," William A. Snyder, Jr., Hunt's lawyer, said yesterday.

Snyder said that Lisa, 22, and Howard St. John, 19, are renting an apartment in suburban Kensington, Md. He said Kevan, 21, is a student at Smith College in Northampton, Mass., while David, 10, is in Miami with his godfather, Dr. Manuel Artime, a leader of the abortive 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion.

Snyder did not anticipate any delay in Hunt's release. For Barker, release may not come until the end of next week at the earliest, according to David Schultz, his lawyer.

"He has to be transported to the District and processed up here," the attorney, Schultz, said.

Schultz described Barker's family as "all very happy, very pleased (about the release). We didn't have

much hope for Barker." The appeal by Barker, who has spent more than a year in prison, and the three other convicted burglars is from the refusal of U.S. District Court Chief Judge John J. Sirica to let them withdraw their guilty pleas and have a jury trial.

The men pleaded guilty last Jan. 15, Schultz said, "on the belief they had at that time that they couldn't disclose information or present their own defense for national security reasons."

Hunt's appeal is more complete. According to Snyder, his lawyer, it is based on what he considers a threat by Sirica of a harsh sentence unless Hunt cooperated with prosecutors, and on disclosures after the plea that some of Hunt's files had been destroyed by former White House aide John Dean III and by former FBI director L. Patrick Gray III.

Hunt also feels, his lawyer said, that "the whole operation was ordered by the Attorney General (John N. Mitchell) and people who could give a lawyer reasonable belief" that the order was legal.

All motions for release pending appeal are based on arguments that the convicted person is not a danger to the community, that he will not flee and that the appeal has a good chance of succeeding.

The office of special prosecutor Leon Jaworski had

argued that the Watergate defendants' appeal was "frivolous." "At least this order establishes that the appeal is not frivolous," Snyder said.

Snyder said Hunt is "overwhelmed" by the court-ordered release. At the federal penitentiary in Allenwood, Pa., where Hunt has been confined, inmates are awakened at 5 a.m. to tend a herd of 5,000 cows, Snyder said.

"Hunt has bad arthritis in his arm," Snyder said, "but he's out there shoveling cow dung every morning in the cold air. The Bureau of Prisons doesn't want to be accused of running a country club for Howard Hunt and they sure aren't."

Of the other Watergate defendants, James W. McCord Jr., sentenced to one to five years in prison, was allowed to remain free last month by Sirica on a \$50,000 appeal bond. McCord has testified before the Senate Watergate committee and federal grand juries. Sirica denied the other defendants' motions for release.

The seventh original Watergate defendant, G. Gordon Liddy, who has steadfastly refused to cooperate with any Watergate investigation, has been sentenced to a minimum of six years and eight months sentence but is currently serving a contempt of court term in D.C. Jail in addition to that.

WASHINGTON POST Thursday, Jan. 10, 1974

U.S. Reportedly Weighed Plot to Kill Castro in '65

NEW YORK, Jan. 9 (AP)—Free-lance journalist Tad Szulc says the United States during President Lyndon Johnson's administration planned a second invasion of Cuba combined with an effort to assassinate Premier Fidel Castro.

The plan had to be canceled, Szulc said in an article to be published in the Jan. 17 Esquire magazine, when rebellion unexpectedly erupted in the

Dominican Republic in April, 1965, and Johnson sent troops to that country.

Szulc, a former diplomatic correspondent for the New York Times, said the operation was planned by the Central Intelligence Agency, "presumably acting with President Lyndon Johnson's authority unless it was another do-it-yourself undertaking." He wrote:

"The new invasion was to be on a smaller scale than the Bay of Pigs. The scenario was to bring ashore some 750 armed

Cubans at the crucial moment when Castro would be dead and inevitable chaos had developed . . .

"The existence of the assassination plot, hatched by the CIA in Paris and Madrid, was disclosed by the Cuban government in March, 1966, after the designated gunman—a bearded Cuban physician and former Cuban revolutionary army major named Rolando Cubela—was arrested in Havana following investigations by Castro's counterintelligence agents, who had become suspicious of him."

Szulc said that although the Cuban government revealed the assassination plot, it never reported the invasion plan, probably because it didn't know much about it.

New York Times
8 January 1974

3 AT WATERGATE GRANTED PAROLE

Their Release Due March 7
After 15 Months in Jail

WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 — Three of the seven Watergate burglars were granted parole today by the United States Parole Board, effective March 7. They will be the first in the case to finish their prison terms.

The three — Frank A. Sturgis, Virgilio R. Gonzalez and Eugenio R. Martinez — were sentenced last November to terms of one to four years in prison for burglary, wiretapping and conspiracy in the break-in of Democratic National Headquarters in June, 1972. They are now in custody at the Federal prison camp at Eglin Air Force Base near Miami.

The man, all Miami residents, will remain on parole until the end of their sentences in January, 1976. They have been in prison 15 months.

Two other Watergate conspirators — Bernard L. Barker and E. Howard Hunt Jr. — were released last week by order pending an appeal of their convictions. A sixth conspirator, James W. McCord Jr., was released earlier, pending an appeal.

The other convicted Watergate participant is G. Gordon Liddy, former counsel to the Finance Committee to Re-elect the President. Until recently, Mr. Liddy was in the District of Columbia jail on contempt of court charge for his failure to answer questions by the Watergate grand jury.

According to a spokesman for the Watergate special prosecutor's office, Mr. Liddy is now in a California jail awaiting trial for his role in the break-in of the office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's former psychiatrist.

New York Times
9 January 1974
McCord's Bond Reduced
From \$50,000 to \$5,000

The Washington Star-News
WASHINGTON, Jan. 8 — Bond for James W. McCord Jr. was lowered today from \$50,000 to \$5,000 by United States District Judge John J. Sirica.

The action, taken at the request of the convicted Watergate conspirator's lawyers, came the day after three other Watergate burglars were granted parole, effective March 7.

The three are Frank A. Sturgis, Eugenio R. Martinez and Virgilio R. Gonzalez. Their parole appears to mean that they will have finished serving their sentences before McCord really starts to serve his.

Mr. McCord was convicted with G. Gordon Liddy last Jan. 30, but he spent only a few weeks in jail before being released on bond.

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, January 3, 1973

FRANK GETLEIN

Hunt's Ingenious Ploy

E. Howard Hunt Jr., the right-wing burglar, got himself sprung out of the pokey last week with a ploy the ingenuity of which was precisely appropriate for a clash between the murky twilight world in which Hunt has operated most of his professional life as spy, dirty-tricks man, surreptitious insurrectionary, electronic eaves-dropper and burglar, and the sunlit world of American justice.



One of the field supervisors of the Watergate break-in, Hunt confessed and was tucked away by Judge Sirica for 30 months to eight years, a remarkably lenient sentence for a convicted criminal whose target was not a dry cleaner's or a liquor store, not even a bank, but the Republic itself.

As of last week, he is out roaming the streets once more, free, as his reactionary admirers never tire of asserting of pettier criminals paroled or freed on appeal, to do it again.

Hunt is free because he has asked the U.S. Court of Appeals here to allow him to change his original plea of guilty to one of not guilty and to decree a new trial on that new plea. The basic reason behind his change of heart as to his own guilt, according to his lawyers, is the contention that improper actions by the U.S. government prejudiced his original trial, making justice impossible.

The improper actions by the government cited by Hunt's lawyers are the taking of documents from Hunt's White House safe and the destruction of them by L. Patrick Gray III, then acting head of the FBI, now practicing law in New London, Conn., in spite of his

attitude toward the destruction of evidence, an attitude one would have thought unseemly in an officer of the court.

Hunt's friends are familiar enough with the technique of criminals charging governmental improprieties and going scot-free. Traditionally, the right has denounced the technique when employed by Mafiosi and other undesirables. More recently, the right has denounced the technique when employed by such victims of apparent government conspiracy as the Berrigan brothers and Dr. Ellsberg. It will be interesting to see how much protest the right generates over Hunt's use of the same ploy.

It is not, however, quite the same ploy, although it looks it.



The difference is this: When the government behaved improperly in the Berrigan affair that caused Henry Kissinger to fear for his virtue at the hands of sex-starved nuns, as he delicately put it, the government was clearly the enemy of the Berrigans, so much so as to employ a criminal as informer, quite possibly as agent-provocateur to some degree.

When the government behaved improperly in the prosecution of Dr. Ellsberg, again the government was the declared enemy of the doctor, of his psychiatrist and of normal American justice, going so far as to burglarize the psychiatrist's office and to dangle an attractive appointment before the presiding judge at Ellsberg's trial.

When the government behaved improperly toward Hunt, however, the government was not Hunt's enemy, but his friend, his employer, his partner and, he confidently if mistakenly

expected, his protector of last resort.

That's quite a difference.

It is true enough that distinctions can and certainly will be made between the U.S. government and the Committee to Re-Elect the President. The two things were, in theory, separate entities.

On the other hand, an old disreputable like Hunt, after two decades of carrying on for the CIA in the style made familiar to all through his novels, may be excused for confusing the two things, for assuming the CREEPs were a mere cover, a surface organization of the sort he was long familiar with, created as a base for his dirty tricks on behalf of the government.



He may be excused the more when we recall that so many of his encounters took place in the White House with people who were top presidential aides and that the papers on the destruction of which he bases his appeal were in the White House and handled by White House personnel.

If Hunt beats the rap on the grounds that the government that hired him as a burglar was subsequently improper in its dealings with him, the course of justice will have no alternative but to go on, in criminal terms, to Gray, the man who destroyed the papers, to the men who gave Gray the papers to destroy and to the man in whose interest they were destroyed.

All of this is merely one of many similar reasons that the Watergate affair will not be over in a hurry and that in the matter of the impeachment the House of Representatives would be seriously derelict in its duties to rush to judgment, to "vote it up or vote it down" before all the evidence is in.

WASHINGTON POST
26 December 1973

Watergate Unit Wants Stolen List

By John Hanrahan
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Watergate special prosecutor's office has been attempting to question the publisher of a U.S.-based anti-communist Chilean newsletter concerning a mailing list allegedly stolen from the Chilean Embassy last year in a break-in that possibly involved Watergate figures.

This was the first public indication that any document may have been stolen during the Chilean Embassy break-in the weekend of May 13-15, 1972—one month before five men were arrested for breaking into and bugging Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate.

The special prosecutor's office has been attempting to determine whether the embassy burglary involved some of the same persons who have been implicated in the Watergate break-in.

Wilson C. Lucom, publisher and managing editor of Chile La Verdad (The Truth), disclosed in a telegram to Acting Attorney General Robert H. Bork and in a telephone interview with The Washington Post that the special prosecutor's

office was attempting to question him in connection with the break-in.

Lucom, a former State Department official, charged that the special prosecutor's office had illegally issued him a subpoena on Nov. 8 to appear before a grand jury. Lucom said that, as a newsletter publisher, he was protected by a Justice Department order prohibiting the subpoenaing of members of the news media except with the specific authorization of the Attorney General.

The subpoena issued to him lacked this necessary authorization and was, therefore, illegal, Lucom said. He charged the special prosecutor's office with harassment.

James Doyle, press spokesman for the special prosecutor's office, acknowledged that the office is interested in questioning Lucom, but declined to discuss the subject matter.

Doyle said that the office wrote Lucom late last month and informed him that it had withdrawn the subpoena after Lucom raised the First Amendment newsman's privilege issue. Doyle said the office had reached "an understanding with Lucom's attorney to have Lucom come in volun-

tarily. Doyle said there was nothing illegal or improper in subpoenaing Lucom, and that Lucom was not being harassed.

Lucom, in a telephone interview, indicated he would not cooperate with the special prosecutor's office. He said he was being asked to answer questions "because they tell me that a mailing list supposedly stolen from the Chilean Embassy May 13-15, contained names of persons who began receiving Chile La Verdad after that date. That, supposedly, was my link to Watergate."

Lucom, noting that the original District of Columbia police report listed "just four radios, a shaver and a passport" as being stolen, said he doesn't believe any mailing list was stolen from the Chilean Embassy. In his telegram to Bork, he said:

"What is really being sought is our long-established circulation list and news sources in Chile."

Lucom called upon Bork to investigate whether the special prosecutor's office is in some way using "harassing, unfounded investigations" to aid Chilean

Communists "in their united effort to overthrow the present Chilean government."

Lucom said that the Watergate investigators had no evidence to link him to the Chilean Embassy break-in, but were instead indulging in "speculations to link me to the Watergate plumbbers." He said he knows none of the persons implicated in the Watergate break-in.

Lucom said he was an assistant to Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius in the early 1940s, and served as deputy and acting chief of mission in Ethiopia in 1944-1945.

D.C. police sources said that the embassy break-in was not intensively investigated at the time it occurred, and was then regarded as routine.

According to a document made public during the Senate select Watergate committee hearings, former presidential counsel John W. Dean III was concerned after the June 17, 1972, Watergate arrests that some of the same persons involved in that break-in were also involved in the Chilean Embassy burglary.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Friday, Jan. 6, 1974

Joseph Ducibella Specialist For CIA On Europe

Dr. Joseph W. Ducibella, 67, a retired foreign affairs specialist, died Tuesday at his home, 7611 Little River Turnpike, Annandale.

A graduate of Catholic University, where he received a doctorate in 1935, Dr. Ducibella had been an instructor in romance languages at St. Joseph's College in Hartford, Conn., and in the D.C. school

system before World War II.

During the war, he served as a lieutenant with Naval Intelligence in North Africa and Italy and then in Washington, where he was acting chief editor of the "History of the Office of Naval Intelligence During World War II."

In 1946, he joined the Central Intelligence Group, later the CIA, as a senior specialist for Western European affairs. He retired in 1966, receiving a silver plaque for distinguished service.

He is survived by his wife, Lillian, of the home; two sons, Robert W. and Joseph C., of Annandale; four brothers, Charles, Salvadore, John and James; three sisters, Mary and Caroline Ducibella, and Lucy Bezzozzi, and a grandchild.

THE NEW REPUBLIC

DECEMBER 29, 1973

There's More to the Story

CIA and the Plumbers

by Tad Szulc

Secret White House domestic and foreign intelligence operations conducted in the name of "national security" outside regular government channels have been much more numerous than is publicly known, and several of them have drawn on the resources of the Central Intelligence Agency despite repeated official disclaimers. They raise serious new questions about the role of President Nixon and the CIA in a number of events. The story of additional activities by the Plumbers and operations undertaken by the White House before and after the formal creation of this special unit in mid-1971, is likely to emerge in trials that follow a new series of indictments expected to be returned during January by Special Watergate Prosecutor Leon Jaworski.

These undisclosed operations are said to include:

- Secret support, outside CIA channels, for the regime of Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda late in 1970, to help him weather a conspiracy to oust him. The White House appeared to be concerned that Kaunda's overthrow by radicals, possibly including Chinese agents, might lead to the seizure of private US copper investments in Zambia. Kaunda reportedly received electronic equipment to tap the telephones and homes of Zambian officials he suspected of plotting. Coincidentally a nephew of the late President Eisenhower was shipping such equipment to Zambia.
- Burglary, or attempts at burglary, at the New York and Washington offices of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, apparently in search of personal data on its top officials, including ITT's President Harold S. Geneen, and other sensitive documents.
- The use of CIA officials attached to the secret Anglo-American intelligence group located at the British Embassy in Washington to secure information on the background of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg after the surfacing of the Pentagon papers in June 1971. The White House bypassed the usual CIA channels here.
- Supply of equipment and false identification papers to the Plumbers' Cuban-American task force by CIA offices in Miami and San Francisco in support of the raid on the offices of Ellsberg's psychiatrist, the Watergate break-ins and other operations.

Jaworski, who has made it clear he will not be deterred in his investigations by White House invocations of "national security," is believed to expect a new breakthrough in the area of the Plumbers' operations after indictments are handed down by a Washington federal grand jury looking into the September 1971 raid on the Beverly Hills offices of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Among those expected to be indicted are John D. Ehrlichman, former head of the White House Domestic Council; former White House Special Counsel Charles W. Colson; G. Gordon Liddy, one of the Plumbers; and the three Cuban-Americans who carried out the Fielding raid: Bernard L. Barker, Eugenio Martinez and Felipe de Diego. Egil Krogh, Jr.,

who pleaded guilty last November 30 to a single charge of criminal conspiracy in the Fielding burglary, is regarded as the star witness for the prosecution, having discarded his "national security" defense.

Prosecutors hope that Krogh will "break wide open" the White House domestic intelligence operations. One source predicts that Krogh's testimony in a trial "may blow the White House out of the water," touching upon everything from the President's own knowledge of various operations to the role of the CIA. Hunt, sources say, will risk contempt of court if he refuses to testify. Ehrlichman, Liddy and Young were indicted earlier by a Los Angeles grand jury, but the California trial has been delayed until April 15 and may be cancelled because the Fielding break-in is now considered part of federal jurisdiction in Washington under the provisions of Title 18 of the US Penal Code.

New information available suggests that the White House was engaged in secret intelligence operations even before the publication of the Pentagon papers and other news leaks led, as alleged by the White House, to the establishment of the Krogh-Young-Hunt-Liddy special unit.

Aside from White House efforts to obtain information in 1969 on the Chappaquiddick incident involving Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, presidential aides are said to have launched private intelligence operations abroad, chiefly because of their distrust of the CIA under the former director, Richard Helms. For instance it is believed that the White House became fearful about Zambia—and the continued supply of copper—about the time the late Salvador Allende Gossens was elected president in Chile, in September 1970, and moved toward the nationalization of American copper companies there. Kaunda is believed to have been in serious danger in October 1970, and pressure on the White House to act may have come from the copper companies.

From what I can learn, the White House dispatched its own unidentified agents to the African country to help Kaunda neutralize his enemies. What remains unclear is whether there was a link between that intervention and a contract held by a Washington public relations man and an outstanding Nixon fund-raiser, to supply Kaunda with bugging and other electronic equipment. The man is Michael Doud Gill, nephew of Mrs. Mamie Eisenhower, who served in 1968 as assistant chairman of United Citizens for Nixon-Agnew. Gill, a friend of President Kaunda, said in a recent newspaper interview that the Zambian had fears of the Chinese who exert considerable influence in neighboring Tanzania. Speaking of the equipment supplied to Kaunda, Gill said that "they were bugging their own officials." Gill's contract came to light in September when his former partner, Marshall Soghoian, was charged in Washington, DC with acting as an unregistered foreign agent for Zambia. Soghoian is free on an unusually high \$100,000 bond pending grand jury in-

TAD SZULC was a diplomatic correspondent for The New York Times.

vestigations. Gill said Soghoian had stolen his contract with the Zambians.

The alleged burglary attempts at ITT offices occurred in 1971 and 1972 as a form of "double insurance" after the corporation offered one million dollars in contributions to the CIA to prevent the inauguration of President Allende in Chile and \$400,000 to the Republican Party in connection with an antitrust suit.

I have been told that "in case of complications, the White House people wanted to have in their hands a lot of personal information about Geneen and others." Testimony before the Senate Watergate Committee by former White House investigators, the Plumbers' forerunners, showed that investigations of personal habits of those of interest to the White House was a frequent procedure. But it cannot be excluded that the Plumbers also looked for incriminating documents concerning 1971 meetings between top administration figures and ITT officials, which resulted in the corporation's success in avoiding antitrust action after its purchase of an insurance company. It should be recalled that in 1972 Hunt was sent to Denver by the White House to persuade Dita Beard, the ITT lobbyist, to say that her memo on the secret deal was a forgery.

Perhaps the most complicated aspect of the Plumbers' operations was their relationship with the CIA. Helms, William E. Colby, the agency's present director and other senior officials have denied in public and in executive sessions before congressional committees that there was any "involvement" with Watergate. Instead they charged White House officials sought to use CIA for the subsequent cover-up. But discrepancies and contradictions raise the question whether the CIA's denial might not have been a "technical denial."

The first discrepancy involves dates. In his May 22 speech President Nixon said that the first meeting he held with Ehrlichman and Krogh for the purpose of setting up an operation to prevent news leaks was on July 24, 1971. But the record of the Watergate hearings showed that Ehrlichman first called General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., then CIA deputy director, as early as July 7 to arrange for a visit by Hunt. Cushman and Hunt met on July 22. Hunt, a CIA veteran (and a friend of General Cushman, who attended Hunt's retirement party the year before), had come to ask CIA help for a "one-time" interview with an unspecified person. The CIA gave him a wig, a speech-alteration device, a small camera, a tape recorder and two sets of false documents. Later, on Hunt's request, the CIA also provided Liddy with false documents.

As it is now known, Hunt was part of a larger operation designed to uncover compromising information about Ellsberg. This was the reason for the Fielding raid. The White House was convinced that Ellsberg may have had access to other classified materials after he made the Pentagon papers available to the press, and that he might be turning them over to the Soviet government. This suspicion, I am told, led the White House to turn to the British for a secret check on Ellsberg's activities during the year he spent at Cambridge University in 1953. The notion at the White House was that Ellsberg may have had contacts with Harold (Kim) Philby, the British intelligence operative who turned out to be a key Soviet espionage agent.

Ehrlichman arranged for the Hunt interview with Cushman about the same time he turned to the joint Anglo-American intelligence group in Washington for information on Ellsberg's Cambridge days. The joint intelligence group functions under an agreement providing for temporary service by CIA agents with MI-6, the British intelligence service, and vice versa. Normally intelligence requests from the US government to the joint group go through CIA headquarters. In this instance, however, Ehrlichman contacted the group directly through a CIA representative. MI-6 passed on the request to MI-5, the British counterespionage agency. The answer on Ellsberg was negative. It is not known whether the CIA official in question apprised Helms of the Ehrlichman request. Investigators think, however, that it is significant that Ehrlichman was acting in the Ellsberg case almost three weeks before Nixon, according to his own statement, gave the go-ahead on the Plumbers' unit. The suspicion arises whether secret domestic intelligence operations may not have been initiated even earlier. According to one version, the White House obtained information on April 17, 1971, that Ellsberg was preparing to turn the Pentagon papers over to the press. The first installment was published in *The New York Times* on June 13.

As far as the CIA's subsequent role is concerned, most investigators are willing to accept Helms' and Colby's technical disclaimer that the agency was "not involved" in Watergate, although they wonder how much the CIA knew about Plumber operations in general.

In October Barker, Martinez and Virgilio R. Gonzales, three of the five Watergate raiders, swore that they knew that equipment for the Fielding and Watergate burglaries as well as false documents for all of them were supplied by the CIA. These claims are contained in affidavits filed in support of a motion, later denied by Judge John J. Sirica, to be allowed to change their pleas from guilty to not guilty in the Watergate affair. A source close to the investigation says that "it would be incredible for them at this late date to commit perjury" in affidavits seeking a favorable court decision.

Barker, a former CIA employee, said in his affidavit that "it appeared to me that the equipment, disguises and fake identification papers that were used in the [Fielding] operation were the type that were used and prepared by the CIA, and at some point Mr. Hunt confirmed my belief and advised that this equipment had been provided by the CIA." Speaking of the Watergate raid, Barker said that "As was the case with the Fielding office entry, fake identification papers that were used in the Watergate entries had been prepared by the CIA." Martinez, who still was on a CIA monthly retainer at the time of the Watergate break-in, said in his affidavit that "equipment which was used during the operation which included mechanical equipment, disguises and false identification papers were the type I associated with the CIA and I was told by Mr. Hunt that the agency had supplied the equipment."

It is of course possible that Hunt was lying to his own men to make it appear that the CIA was behind all the Plumber operations. But there is no question that the CIA provided false papers to the Cuban-

Americans through its "Green Light" group in Miami. The "Green Light" group, a section of the CIA station in Miami headed by William Davis, specializes in screening Cuban refugees from the island to determine whether they may be engaged as agents to be infiltrated back to Cuba. It has ample facilities for clandestine work. Eugenio Martinez worked for "Green Light." Neither Helms nor his associates were ever asked by the Senate Watergate Committee whether the CIA had provided false documents to the Cuban-Americans, in addition to the papers CIA gave Hunt and Liddy. Helms has indirectly denied that the CIA provided the Plumbers with burglary equipment, but sources claim it did come from the agency's office in Burlingame, a suburb of San Francisco. Helms testified that he learned about the Fielding break-in only last May and that "I was assured by the CIA that equipment given Hunt was not used in the break-in."

It is possible that the CIA's top echelon simply chose to look the other way after supplying the Plumbers with their needs on the theory that in dealing with the White House, "What you don't know, doesn't hurt you." It is also possible that Helms, personally distrusted by the White House, was kept in the dark by subordinates. Nixon claims his subordinates failed to inform him. There is no other explanation for the CIA's apparent lack of interest in Hunt's activities after he had requested assistance from General Cushman. Hunt, after all, had been a fairly important CIA official and his involvement in national security areas on the White House's behalf could not have failed to arouse professional interest in the agency. In his testimony, however, Helms insisted the CIA became interested in Hunt and the others, all former CIA employ-

ees, only *after* Watergate. Cushman testified that it would be unlikely for the CIA to provide aid without the clearance by headquarters. This, then, leaves officially unanswered the question of where the Cuban-Americans got their false documents found on them, after they were arrested at Watergate.

Investigators reject published allegations that Martinez kept the CIA informed throughout of the Plumbers' operations. They believe that the agency may have been willing to provide support for them, but eschew any knowledge of what they did—at least in the initial stages. On this controversial point, Martinez' sworn affidavit throws new and interesting light: ". . . I broached the name of Mr. Hunt with my [CIA] supervising agent sometime around the time of the Fielding office entry. The subsequent response I received from my supervising agent indicated to me that he had not been informed by his superiors and accordingly, that I was not supposed to disclose any information about these operations to him."

At this point if Martinez is telling the truth, the CIA was indeed looking the other way. But Martinez goes on: "At some point, either shortly before the first Watergate or between the first and second Watergate entry, my supervising agent in the Miami area made an inquiry of me with respect to any information I had regarding activities of Mr. Hunt." This contradicts directly Helms' testimony. Martinez said he refused to answer on national security grounds. But a few days later, on June 17, 1972, the CIA had its answer about Hunt. Other answers about the Plumbers—and about the innumerable contradictions in the Watergate matter—should emerge when Krogh & Co. begin to testify.

Thai Truce Letter Sent by CIA Man

Phony Offer of
Peace Regretted
by U.S. Embassy

BY JACK FOISIE
Times Staff Writer

BANGKOK — The U.S. Embassy here admitted Saturday that a member of the Central Intelligence Agency had with "regrettable and unauthorized initiative sent a phony letter to Thailand's prime minister offering a truce on behalf of Thai insurgents.

The disclosure confirmed a story published earlier by a Thai English-language newspaper, The Nation.

The embassy spokesman, Terry Shroeder, declined to say what motivated the letter. Nor would he name the individual involved or say whether the agent had been reprimanded. The agent worked in northeast Thailand where the insurgency represents a substantial threat to security.

According to informed sources the letter was written and mailed in November to the new Thai prime minister, Sanya Dharmasakti. Signed by a purported insurgent leader, "Chamras," it proposed that control of insurgent-held areas in the northeast, mainly adjacent to the Laos border, be recognized by the government and allowed autonomous rule. In return the insurgents pledged not to seek to expand their insurgency.

The offer, when publicized, was officially ignored by government leaders and its authenticity was discounted. However, in a related response weeks later, Prime Minister Sanya renewed a government offer of amnesty to insurgents who would give up the fight.

The matter subsided until Saturday when The Nation attributed the letter's

authorship to the CIA. The newspaper said the agent, while taking any return address off the letter, had left his own mailing address on the form he signed to have the letter registered. This made the letter easy to trace.

Speaking for U.S. Ambassador William Kintner, the spokesman said "the incident of the cease-fire letter has been discussed with appropriate Thai officers. It is a regrettable and unauthorized initiative. The American ambassador has directed categorically that no American official be involved in any activity which could be interpreted as interference in Thai internal affairs."

The affair is the latest in recent Thai-American exchanges which have led to afterthought statements and red faces.

Thai-American relations are particularly sensitive now, as the Thai government seeks to reestablish trade and perhaps diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

As a result, Thai officials have been playing the numbers game on the actual size of U.S. forces in Thailand. Defense Minister Dawee Chullasapya has announced the number is below 33,000 and going lower soon.

The American figure is 35,000 and negotiations are continuing on "possible further reduction." So far only one American air base in Thailand has been closed since the cease-fire declared in Vietnam a year ago. Six bases remain open and active in training and reconnaissance flights over Indochina. The number of U.S. servicemen in Thailand is greater than anywhere overseas except for North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in West Germany.

The Americans want to negotiate a status-of-forces agreement to regularize the long-term presence of some troops in Thailand. Replying to a query on the progress of such talks, Thai Foreign Ministry spokesman Pracha Gunakasem snapped:

"As long as there are American soldiers in Thailand they will be under Thai law."

Under recently arrived Ambassador Kintner, ef-

CIA Danger To Thai, Writer Says

Express — France Presse

BANGKOK (AFP) — A columnist of the influential afternoon daily Siam Rath has warned the new government of the possible danger posed by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Citing the past CIA record in South Vietnam and Cambodia as an example, columnist Kasen Atchayasai wrote that overthrow was likely in any developing country whose regime was found to pursue policies contrary to U.S. interests.

Because of the big interests of the United States in Thailand, it was unlikely that the American government would approve any sudden change in Thai policies, the columnist wrote.

HE SAID that although the CIA had played no part in the recent student uprising that led to the change in government, it was very likely that the agency was watching closely any change which might result in damage to U.S. interest.

He pleaded that the government use astute judgement towards the Americans as to avoid any repeat of the bloodshed that occurred Oct. 14.

"This is not an attempt to in-

fects have been made to reduce some of the more visible symbols of official American presence in Thailand. American military shopping centers have been reduced. Recreational facilities have been reduced or closed. American military police walking Bangkok streets no longer carry arms.

Thais appear to appreciate these efforts, while continuing to express concern at the reduction in Thai civilian employment at American military bases and in U.S. agencies. There are at present about 30,000 Thais so employed.

Recently they were all given a pay raise, after a strike of Thai employees in the Bangkok post exchange—the military-run shopping center. Thai employees at more-or-less permanent American agencies have a pension plan, with the U.S. government contributing the major share.

cite the Thai government to expel the GI's or abandon relations," the article said.

"What is wanted is that the government should proceed to find means to win bargains for the reduction of U.S. power in a more suitable way. It should not allow the United States to do just as it pleases, as it has in the past."

Meanwhile, in Washington, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Monteagle Stearns told Congress that the U.S. Government foresees no need for basic changes in its policy towards Thailand because of the collapse of the military regime.

"THE UNITED STATES expects no change in the atmosphere of cooperation and mutual understanding that characterized U.S.-Thai relations in the past," he said.

He added that the United States expected to provide such support and assistance as was necessary to maintain Thailand's security and promote its economic development. "We expect to continue our dialogue with the Thai government regarding the U.S. military forces in Thailand, bearing in mind the mutual security interests they serve and the sovereign prerogatives of our Thai hosts," he said.

Commenting on the American presence in Thailand — six military bases, 35,000 troops — the Thai foreign minister confirmed that the ultimate goal was "total withdrawal."

However, he added, "it will take time and it depends on the situation."

NEW YORK TIMES
19 December 1973

Ex-C.I.A. Agent Is Cleared On Illegal Weapon Charges

PHILADELPHIA, Dec. 18 (AP)—The man who reportedly possessed the largest private arsenal ever found in Philadelphia was found not guilty yesterday in Municipal Court of illegal weapon charges.

George E. Fassnacht, a former agent of the Central Intelligence Agency, was set free when the judge ruled there had been insufficient prosecution evidence to tie Mr. Fassnacht to machine guns found in the home of his wife's friend.

A search of Mr. Fassnacht's home in June, 1971, was ruled illegal by another judge about a month ago. That search turned up a quantity of explosives, hand grenades, bombs, small arms and ammunitions.

ew York Times
0 Jan. 1974

Protesting Thais Demand Ouster of American Envoy

BANGKOK, Thailand, Jan. 9 (AP)—Shouting, jeering Thai students demanded the ouster of the United States Ambassador today and protested the visit by the Japanese Premier.

More than 4,000 students, professors and others massed outside the United States Embassy here demanding that the ambassador, William R. Kintner, and the United States Central Intelligence Agency get out of the country. Student marshals kept order and the demonstration, organized by People for Democratic Action, broke up after about two hours. Mr. Kintner was in northern Thailand.

The demonstrations were some of the strongest since students toppled the military regime in October and became the only significant organized political force.

The Japanese Premier, Kakuei Tanaka, who is on a five-country Southeast Asian tour, gave a hastily revised speech at a dinner in his honor given by Premier Sanya Dharmasakti after being delayed by students who barricaded the entrances to his hotel. He said the demonstrations made him aware of "the concern of the Thai people about the role of Japanese influence."

Kintner Was in C.I.A.

The protests against Mr. Kintner and the C.I.A. were touched off by reports Saturday that a C.I.A. agent had sent a letter to Premier Sanya in the name of a Communist insurgent. The letter offered a cease-fire in exchange for autonomy in rebel areas in northwestern Thailand. Mr. Kintner, who served with the C.I.A. in Washington in 1950-52, told Thai newsmen yesterday that the agent in question had been sent out of Thailand and "appropriate disciplinary action had been taken."

Strain May Develop

By JAMES F. CLARITY,
Special to The New York Times

BANGKOK, Thailand, Jan. 9—Knowledgeable Western diplomatic officials say relations between the United States and Thailand could be severely strained by the recent admitted interference of the Central Intelligence Agency in Thai affairs.

The officials said American diplomats were apprehensive about the consequences of the incident, in which the United States Embassy admitted that a C.I.A. agent had written a letter in the name of a Communist insurgent leader proposing a cease-fire between the rebels and the interim Government of Premier Sanya Pharamasakti.

The United States Ambassa-

dor, William R. Kintner, was said to be "extremely annoyed" at the incident.

Officially, Mr. Kintner has apologized for the letter and said that he has ordered that in the future "no American official be involved in any activity which could be interpreted as an interference in Thai internal affairs."

The Government, which is said to have leaked the information to the press, has made no official comment. But several ranking officials have said privately that there should be an investigation.

The students, whose uprising in October overthrew the military government here, are considered the most powerful political force in Thailand. In the days following disclosure of the C.I.A. incident, the students issued demands for an examination of American intelligence activities in the country. But they stopped short of suggesting more serious measures, such as withdrawal of American military personnel or a formal Government protest to Washington.

Author Not Identified

The agent who wrote the letter has not been identified, but his plot has been explained by officials familiar with the situation. The letter purported to be from "Chamras," the pseudonym of a Communist insurgent leader in northeast Thailand. The letter, a copy of which was published in *The Nation*, seemed clever enough.

Addressed to Premier Sanya, it says in part that "we greatly pity the Thai soldiers who have to come and fight against us because they are fooled by imperialist America." It also says, in proposing a cease-fire in return for amnesty and autonomy in insurgent-held areas, that "the views in this letter may well not be the views of the entire Peoples Liberation Army."

The letter, dated Dec. 5, was received by Premier Sanya, who reportedly became suspicious and had its source checked. It was learned that the office boy who mailed the letter registered it with the proper return address, which was traced to an office of the C.I.A.

New York Times
10 Jan. 1974

Don't Look Now...

By Anthony Lewis

There was a small story in the paper the other day about a Central Intelligence Agency operative out in Thailand faking a letter from the local guerrillas to the Thai Government. The agency apologized to the Thais for the incident, described it as an aberration and said it would never happen again.

A reassuring story, that. It tells us that we can still count on the covert operations people at the C.I.A.—the men who planned the Bay of Pigs, carried on a secret war in Laos, subsidized cultural organizations and foreign politicians, and provided technical aid for the White House burglary squad.

What we want is to keep such things secret. Right? National security demands that the American people have no idea of the political tricks and covert wars carried on in their name, even years ago. Right?

Those propositions may sound absurd but they would be serious if the C.I.A. and the Justice Department prevail in a legal argument they are making right now in the Federal District Court in Alexandria, Va. The case is one that ought to concern anyone who cares about freedom and public control of government in the United States.

It all began when Victor Marchetti, a respected official of the C.I.A. from 1955 to 1969, decided to write a book about it. The agency went to court and got an order barring him from publishing anything, "factual, fictional or otherwise," without its consent. The basis for the injunction was that Marchetti, in going to work for the C.I.A., had agreed not to disclose classified matters.

With the help of a former Foreign Service officer, John Marks, Marchetti went ahead and wrote his book. He

ABROAD AT HOME

sent it to the agency, where 50 people spent 1,700 hours going over it. (Who were they? The imagination reels.) They ordered 339 passages cut—fifth of the book.

Marchetti pleaded that many of the censored items had already appeared in print. C.I.A. officials thought again and agreed to reduce their deletions to 225. We can see the restored 114, and they give an idea of the sort of thing censors would cut if they had their way. For example:

• A paragraph about a program to send balloons from Taiwan over mainland China, carrying propaganda.

• References to Air America as a "C.I.A.-owned airline" in Indochina—

very likely the worst-kept secret in official history.

• Numerous mentions of the well-known fact that the C.I.A. in the 1950's, supported efforts to overthrow the Sukarno Government in Indonesia.

• An eight-word passage saying that the British secret service helped Greville Wynne, an Englishman jailed by the Soviet Union as a spy, to write a book.

• A statement that some supposed journalists overseas actually work for the C.I.A.—a fact leaked by the C.I.A. itself recently.

• A descriptive phrase saying that a story by Seymour Hersh of The New York Times about secret C.I.A. payments to one wing of the Italian Christian Democratic party was "thoroughly verified."

British ghosting, newspaper adjectives, intelligence fiascos of the past: Those are the molehills that fifty people labored 1,700 hours to turn into national security mountains. It is easy to laugh at such bumbledom, as Taylor Branch called it in an acid analysis of the case in last month's Harper's magazine. Marchetti's publisher, Alfred A. Knopf, is thinking of publishing the book with blanks and sending the missing words to buyers if and when it wins the case.

But of course it is not really funny. The United States needs more light on its national security policies, not less. Policy-making by experts without public scrutiny is what got us into such disasters as Vietnam.

Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. has ordered the C.I.A. to produce reasons for its 225 deletions in the Marchetti manuscript, and to clear some experts who can help Marchetti argue against them. This has brought protests from the C.I.A. director, William E. Colby, who wants a secret hearing to tell the judge why he can't do that.

A certain skepticism about Mr. Colby is in order. He helped to create that sinister C.I.A. operation, the Phoenix program, to arrest, torture and assassinate suspected dissidents in Vietnam; he may understandably prefer darkness to light.

In fact, it would be awkward to have to justify classifications to a court. But the trouble lies in a system that classifies everything important as a secret. Marchetti and Marks are reasonable men and might well have agreed if they had been asked to drop two or three references to serious current intelligence matters. Instead, the C.I.A. went to court with its dangerous broadside argument.

Everyone who works on classified material promises not to disclose it. If that "contract" can bring an injunction years later, free speech will have been drastically reduced. When some official resigns from Government in disagreement with, say, the invasion of Cambodia, he will not only have his telephone tapped; Henry Kissinger will try to enjoin him from expressing his disagreement. It would be hard to overrate the danger of that.

WASHINGTON POST

22 DEC 1973

CIA Justification Ordered

Ex-Intelligence Men Win Round on Book

Two former government intelligence officers won a preliminary round in their legal fight to restore censorship deletions by the Central Intelligence Agency in a manuscript describing operations of the agency.

U.S. District Court Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. in Alexandria ordered the government to produce documents to support the 225 security deletions it made in the book manuscript of former Central Intelligence Agency official Victor Marchetti and former State Department intelligence officer John Marks.

The CIA, in ordering the deletions under a previous U.S. Court of Appeals order, said four of its deputy directors had decided that the deleted matter violated security classification. But the government produced no documents to support the decisions.

The Marchetti-Marks manuscript, entitled "CIA, the Cult of Intelligence" and scheduled for publication by Knopf, described specific and potentially controversial operations of the CIA's Clandestine Division over a period of years. It reportedly goes into the

CIA's dealings with prominent foreign leaders as well as "black" intelligence operations abroad.

Yesterday's decision by Judge Bryan requires that Knopf's lawyer, Floyd Abrams be given clearance to examine deleted portions of the manuscript, a move the government opposed.

It also requires the government to clear former National Security Council staffer Morton Halperin for access to the material in the book that the government claims to be classified.

The two authors asked that Halperin serve as a witness to help pass on the government's classification of the manuscript from a national security standpoint.

Halperin, a witness in the Pentagon papers case, is currently suing Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger for damages in the government security tapping of Halperin's phone between May, 1969, and February, 1971.

Marchetti and Marks also named Kissinger as a defendant in their countersuit against the government. The State Department is seeking to enjoin Marks, formerly an officer in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, from publishing material gathered during his period of government service without prior official review.

WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Jan. 9, 1974

CIA Doubles Air America Asia Awards

Associated Press

Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) said yesterday that defense contracts for Air America, which has done work for the Central Intelligence Agency in Indochina, more than doubled last year to a total of \$41.4 million. "Apparently, unknown to the American public, the CIA has taken up some of the slack created by our military with-

drawal," said Aspin, a former Pentagon economic adviser.

"Without a doubt," he said, "the contracts reflect substantial U.S. involvement in the Southeast Asia war, and that's the last thing we want."

Aspin said nearly all contracts were for Air America operations out of Thailand or for maintenance work on planes based in Thailand.

The CIA and Air America had no comment.

Aspin said the \$41.4 million in contracts, compared with \$17.7 million the year before, moved Air America's parent company, Pacific Corp., up to the 91st in the ranking of defense contractors.

WASHINGTON POST Saturday, Jan. 5, 1974

Head of CIA Enters Book Court Fight

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby has intervened directly in a court battle over a book manuscript that he said would compromise highly sensitive intelligence sources and operations.

The CIA director, in an affidavit filed Wednesday in U.S. District Court in Alexandria, offered to testify in private before Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. in support of the government's efforts to prevent publication of 225 deletions ordered by the agency on security grounds.

Colby asserted that the disclosures in the manuscript by two former government intelligence officers would "cause serious harm to the national defense interests of the United States and will seriously disrupt the conduct of this country's foreign relations."

The authors of the manuscript, former CIA analyst Victor L. Marchetti and former State Department intelligence official John D. Marks, are challenging the basis of the CIA's security deletions. This could lead to a new legal battle on the issues of governmental secrecy powers that were thrashed out in the Pentagon Papers trial, which was decided by the Supreme Court.

Specifically, the government has asked Bryan to reconsider his Dec. 21 ruling requiring the CIA to produce documents supporting its classification of the 225 offending items in the Marchetti-Marks manuscript, entitled "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence."

Attorneys for the government also asked Bryan to reconsider his order that attorneys for the publisher, Knopf, and expert witnesses on classification be given access to the manuscript, which the CIA has classified "Top Secret/Sensitive."

In his affidavit, Colby said of the Bryan ruling:

"Production of additional documents as ordered by the court causes additional difficulties for the Central Intelligence Agency. These additional documents will in most cases contain further classified information and in many cases are of a highly sensitive

nature..."

"Compliance with both aspects of the court's order exposes additional highly classified information not only to plaintiffs and their attorneys but to their expert witnesses."

The one expert witness to be qualified under Bryan's Dec. 21 decision was former National Security Council staffer Morton Halperin, who served as part of the defense team for Daniel Ellsberg in his California trial. Halperin is also currently using Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger for damages in the tapping of his telephone from 1969 to 1971.

In requesting the second hearing before Bryan on the reconsideration issue, Colby cited the language of the 1947 National Security Act, which provides that "the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

The CIA director is also he is "personally responsible of leaked privileged and confidential information, for any damage to the publication of testimony before a grand jury or before the Watergate investigation."

Earlier this year, author Jack Anderson published transcripts of grand jury proceedings in the Watergate investigation.

The government brought its case against Marchetti in April, 1972, after obtaining a copy of a book entitled "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" submitted to several New York publishers. It dealt with covert intelligence operations.

The government was granted an injunction preventing Marchetti from publishing, without prior review by the agency, classified material gathered during CIA service. The injunction was upheld by the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

After Marchetti, in collaboration with Marks, completed the manuscript and submitted it for CIA review, the two authors went ahead with legal challenge of the 225 deletions ordered by the agency.

In their challenge of the security actions the two authors are seeking to invoke the standard applied by the Supreme Court in the Pentagon Papers case — whether publication would "surely result in direct, immediate and irreparable injury to the nation or the people."

But the case has not yet moved on to this issue.

New York Times

11 Jan. 1974

C.I.A. HEAD LOSES APPEAL TO JUDGE

Court Denies Him a Private
Hearing in Suit Over Book
Agency Seeks to Censor

By LESLEY OELSNER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 10 — A Federal district judge has turned down the request of the Director of Central Intelligence for a chance to testify about a book that the agency is trying to censor. He also upheld a ruling that he had made earlier ordering the agency to turn over certain documents to the book's authors and publisher and their expert witnesses.

The book, whose co-author is a former employee of the agency, reportedly contends that the agency has been "absolutely unsuccessful" in gathering information about the Russians through traditional espionage techniques, but that it has been "very effective" in the so-called third-world nations.

The same Federal judge, Albert V. Bryan Jr. of the District Court in Alexandria, Va., ruled in 1972 that the former C.I.A. workers, Victor L. Marchetti, must submit his manuscript to the C.I.A. for approval before publication.

But both he and the United States Court of Appeals left open the possibility of challenging any changes that the agency might want to make, and last fall, after the manuscript had been submitted and the agency specified 225 deletions, Mr. Marchetti and his co-author, John Marks, filed their lawsuit.

Plea Made Last Week

The C.I.A. director, William E. Colby, made his request for a closed-door hearing last week, after Judge Bryan, at the request of the authors, had ordered the agency to provide certain material to the authors, their publisher and their expert witnesses.

The authors and the publisher had argued that they needed the material to prepare their lawsuit.

Mr. Colby told Judge Bryan, in a three-page affidavit, that the material covered by the ruling was "highly classified" and that the ruling could thus lead to "serious harm to the national defense interest of the United States."

He specifically objected to

the fact that the judge had ordered the agency to turn over the classified material not only to the authors and their publisher, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., but also to their security experts — a group including Morton H. Halperin, a former consultant to the National Security Council and a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.

The authors and the publisher had contended that they needed the experts' advice and opinions to contest the specific deletions that the C.I.A. demanded. Mr. Colby, however, said in his affidavit that if the experts were allowed to see the material, the information might be "leaked" to the public.

But Judge Bryan, in a decision filed in court yesterday and received by attorneys in the case today, stood by his original ruling requiring the production of the documents.

In a two-page ruling, he rejected Mr. Colby's request for reconsideration of the matter and for a chance to explain his request. In addition, he denied the C.I.A.'s alternative request that he allow the original ruling to be appealed.

Judge Bryan said that the authors and publisher needed the material to challenge "the fact" that the 225 items were, as the C.I.A. contends, classified material and also to determine whether information in the book, as the authors contend, has already been made public and is thus not properly classified as secret.

"The plaintiffs," he said, "may need expert assistance in inquiring into these matters."

Judge Bryan also said that the persons to whom the information was to be disclosed would be covered by a "protective order" forbidding them to make the material public. He pointed out that certain classified material had already been turned over during the litigation.

They, too, were covered by a protective order, he said, "and there is no suggestion that any such orders have been violated."

Judge Bryan ordered Mr. Colby and the C.I.A. to comply with his order "forthwith." David Anderson, the Justice Department attorney who is now in charge of the Government's defense in the case, said this afternoon that he had not yet had a chance to study the ruling and thus could not say when the documents would be produced.

Judge Bryan's initial ruling ordering Mr. Marchetti to submit the manuscript to the agency before publication was based on a pledge of secrecy that he signed when he joined the agency in 1955.

WASHINGTON POST

9 JAN 1974

Poster

Pressing Down

A Commentary

By Nicholas von Hoffman

At a moment when most people believe that the media has gotten the government off its back, the communications industry is in deep trouble with the courts, the Justice Department and the Federal Communications Commission. CBS has gone so far as to say that the department is executing an "unlawful plan to use the power and machinery of the federal government to restrain, intimidate and inhibit criticism" of the administration.

Whether or not you want to go that far, publishers and broadcasters are being forced to spend such huge amounts of money in litigation that, win or lose, they may decide that risking disapproval in Washington is too expensive.

The CIA for the first time in our history has succeeded in getting a court to place a prior restraint on the publication of a book. Written by Victor Marchetti and John Marks, former employees of the CIA and State Department, respectively, the printing of "The CIA and The Cult of Intelligence" has been held up for so many months it may have lost much of its timeliness and commercial value. That's nothing compared to what has had to be spent on legal fees fighting the case. The president of Random House, Robert Bernstein, says he's going to get the book out one way or another, even if that means printing it with blank spaces indicating the hundreds of cuts ordered by the government censors.

LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH

7 JAN 1974

CIA planned to bug family pets

By RICHARD BEESTON
in Washington

THE CIA planned to secrete bugging devices in household pets, it is revealed in a book written by a former CIA analyst and a former State Department official.

The idea was dropped when it was realised that it was not possible to ensure that the dogs or cats would be near while their owners were saying anything worth recording.

Deletion of the revelation is one of over 200, the CIA want to make in the book because, it says, they will compromise highly sensitive intelligence sources and operations.

The head of the CIA, Mr

William Colby, has now intervened directly in a court battle over the manuscript of the book. The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence...

He is supporting Government efforts to prevent publication of 225 deletions ordered by the CIA.

The book is written by Mr Victor Marchetti, the former analyst and Mr John Marks, former State Department intelligence official.

Dirty tricks

The book asserts that two-thirds of the CIA's money and manpower is devoted to covert activities in the form of "dirty tricks" and paramilitary operations, and provides fresh material for ridicule.

What is more disturbing for the CIA in the book is that it lists its ties with foreign political leaders. One is an allegation that Signor Fanfani, former Italian Prime Minister, allegedly requested one million dollars from the agency to strengthen his campaign against the Italian Left.

News Officials Oppose Any Links of Correspondents to the C.I.A.

By MARTIN ARNOLD

Many of the major news-gathering organizations say that they would discharge immediately any correspondent who was also found to be working for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Their stands were made known following the recent disclosure that the C.I.A. had about three dozen American newsmen working abroad on its payroll as undercover informants or as full-time intelligence agents who use journalism as their cover.

In addition, over the years, the agency has attempted to recruit newsmen working in the United States to supply it with domestic intelligence.

Interviews with news officials indicated that the idea that newsmen would work for any government agency, including the C.I.A., was profoundly disturbing for news-gathering organizations for it raised the question of the credibility of the news that such an agent-journalist would file.

Opposition by the A.P.

Keith Fuller, vice president and assistant general manager of the Associated Press said, "We would not permit it for one moment. We don't want our people working for any government agency, under any circumstances."

The Associated Press has nearly 800 full-time employees working overseas, and nearly 850 "stringers" — journalists who usually work for themselves and sell news articles, one at a time, to news organizations.

Most foreign news that appears in American newspapers and is reported on radio and television here is supplied by either The Associated Press or the United Press International, which has about 600 full-time employees overseas. Both organizations said that they would immediately dismiss any corre-

spondent found to be working also for the C.I.A.

"I'm satisfied that none of our people are involved with the C.I.A.," said H. L. Stevenson, U.P.I. managing editor. "And our Washington manager is satisfied that we are clear. We would very promptly discharge anyone who was involved."

In response to queries, the C.I.A. has assured The New York Times, where dismissal would be immediate, and Time magazine and The Washington Star-News, among others, that their correspondents were not connected with the agency.

But Fred Taylor, managing editor of The Wall Street Journal, said that the agency would not admit it if it had a valuable agent who was also a newsmen.

"A reporter has to be objective, and can't serve two masters," Mr. Taylor said. "So far we're taking on good faith that our people are not involved. But it's risky in organizations which have a lot of people overseas. Sooner or later, an agent-journalist would be discovered, however." At The Wall Street Journal such a newsmen would be dismissed immediately.

William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, has indicated that full-time staff correspondents working for general circulation news-gathering organizations will be phased out of C.I.A. work, but that about 30 others—mostly agents who work abroad as free-lance writers and stringers—will continue to be maintained.

Malcolm W. Browne, a New York Times foreign correspondent, said that when he was working for U.P.I. in Saigon there were a number of foreign correspondents he believed were working at least, in part, for the agency.

The problem of correspondents working for the agency is also somewhat confused by

the very nature of the correspondent's business. That is, in the gathering of news, it is an acceptable journalistic practice to have contacts within the agency.

"There's hardly a career correspondent who doesn't have his C.I.A. contacts, and it's a two-way street sometimes — the correspondent and the agency simply must exchange information," Mr. Browne said. "Just as a correspondent must exchange information sometimes with an Ambassador."

A spot check of five New York Times correspondents recently showed that two of them said that they did not believe that they had come in contact with any agent-journalists during their work, while three were pretty well convinced that they had, although both reported they lacked proof.

One Times correspondent, Juan de Onis, said that when he worked in Latin America and South America there "were some American journalists who seemed to have developed unusually close relations, which have served the agency in putting out its line."

Communist Role Hinted

He said that he felt the agency tried to use correspondents to manage the news—that is, to write articles reflecting the desires of the agency.

During the revolution in the Dominican Republic in 1965, Mr. de Onis and this reporter were approached by an agent of the C.I.A. who had with him a large pile of documents.

The documents were purported by the agent to have been stolen by the agency from the headquarters of what the United States Government called the Communist party in the Dominican Republic, and they showed that the Dominican Republic, and they showed that the Dominican revolution was being conducted on orders from Communists in Europe. This was the Johnson Administra-

tion's contention.

Mr. De Onis, an expert on Latin American affairs, declined to write such an article because, he said, there was no way to determine whether or not the documents were authentic.

Perhaps even touchier is the subject of domestic newspapermen working for the agency, which is proscribed by law from intelligence operations within the United States.

Several years ago, for instance, a New York Times reporter who worked in New York City visited the agency's headquarters in Langley, Va., to get information for an article he was preparing. During the interviews he was told by C.I.A. personnel a great deal about the inner workings of The Times — information that had not previously been published elsewhere.

And some years before that, a reporter for a large and influential newspaper in the Middle West was approached by the business agent for a local labor unit.

The business agent told him, in strict confidence, that he also worked for the C.I.A. that as a union official he attended a great number of international labor meetings in Latin America and that he reported on those meetings to the agency.

The official then asked the reporter, who covered labor news, if he would be willing to prepare similar reports for the agency about "labor doings in the Middle West." For this service, the reporter recalled, he was assured that periodically the agency would deposit money, not great amounts, in the reporter's bank account. The reporter turned down the offer, but tried unsuccessfully to determine whether or not the agency had actually made it.

NEW YORK TIMES

4 NOV 1973

Give Us This Day

To the Editor:

In regard to Trumbull Higgins's comment on "Give Us This Day," which describes the Bay of Pigs expedition of 1961, permit me to point out that among his errors is the assumption that we were bent on "restoring the old regime." Nothing of the kind. Both the Cuban-exile, political/military leaders and the Brigade members detested Batista. My book fully describes the non-Batista, non-Castrista makeup of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, which was to have formed the post-Castro provisional government.

So Lieut.-Gen. Charles Ca-

bell was Deputy Director of the C.I.A. in 1954? Let your reviewer check his files. And where did "Operation El Diablo" come from? True, we had a project name for the overthrow of the Arbenz Government in Guatemala . . . but "El Diablo" is far from it, and fanciful to boot.

Higgins indicts me for not knowing what was going on at the top levels in Washington, suggesting that I could have made "a more damaging attack upon [my] enemies" had I concentrated on that confused scene. As a field agent, I had no possible means of learning that "Kennedy had gutted the National Security Council." I was in Florida and Central America, not at a Washington

desk. However, I saw the results of that "gutting," and the far-reaching aftermath of the Brigade's betrayal . . . So did 1300 men of Brigade 2506.

Despite Higgins's cavil that "no mere improvement in techniques works very well," the historical fact is that the populace of the Bay of Pigs region quickly swung over to the invaders . . . until remaining Castro air power deprived the Brigade of all matériel essential to sustaining its inland drive.

The United States (then personified by the New Frontier) first hesitated then abandoned the invasion Brigade. It bugged out. And the world is the worse for that monumental cowardice.

E. HOWARD HUNT JR.
New Rochelle, N. Y.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

21 DEC 1973

Donald Kirk

Reporters who work for the CIA

LANGLEY, Va. — The sign on the George Washington Parkway says "CIA" in white letters on green paint and no apologies for the lack of secrecy. It wasn't always that way. Until a year ago, before James Schlesinger, now defense secretary, was director of the agency, you had to poke around asking the local gas station operator where was the CIA, and he told you to turn at this little sign that said "Fairbanks

Bill Anderson continues on vacation. The writer of today's column, Donald Kirk, is The Tribune's Far Eastern correspondent who is currently in the United States.

Highway Research Center." You got a feeling of real inside knowledge and even power as you swung off the parkway, down a pleasant country-looking lane, and past the big wire fence surrounding the sprawling layout enshrining the castle of all spookdom.

That research center cover, as Schlesinger had the good taste to realize, was a rather childish joke, since the Russian KGB agents no doubt speak idiomatic enough English to elicit the same material from the same gas station operator, who doubtless is a good patriot even if not sworn to protect the nation's secrets. It was an even better joke, it seemed to me, when I called the CIA headquarters the other day and

got this strange klunking on the line. I figured it was one of those wiretapping gadgets I'd been reading about in the papers, but then the man I was talking to at the agency asked me what was this klunking—the people at the agency had been trying to work it out for days.

I said I didn't know, I thought it was one of their new toys, I didn't play with tape-recorders myself and had every sympathy with Ms. Woods for her inability to work the machine right, I'm sure I would have made the same mistake. "Ha, ha, ha," said the man on the line, who otherwise requested that he not be quoted, which was just as well anyway because he turned very serious and uninformative when I got down to the question that I had really wanted answered in the first place: What was the CIA doing employing newsmen as "agents," as reported in the papers. The man on the line said the CIA was not talking about that topic, but I could still come around for a chat.

Of course, why not, but I wondered about the quid pro quo: What was I expected to give in return, and I remembered various correspondents whom I had known in Indochina who always seemed first in line for those intimate little scances with four-star generals and "station chiefs" while the rest of us were left grasping at the sleeves of lieutenant colonels and second secretaries. Sometimes these correspondents didn't write as much as one would have

expected from such easy access, and I'm sure some of them did regard it as altogether fitting to pass along information on the "two-way street" theory.

But what about this "two-way street" theory, anyway? Aren't we, as taxpayers, writing for taxpayers, entitled to access to top-level, unclassified information without giving in return? I think so. I don't think there should be any quid pro quo at all. I think it's immoral, unethical and stupid to suggest, as did the curator of the Nieman Foundation in an article for the New York Times Magazine a Sunday or two ago, that a reporter should give information in order to get it.

Because once you start buying the two-way street theory, a few of us get carried away and start selling information. Oh, perhaps we get nothing more than free lunches and sweet smiles in return, but then a few of us, a very few, start getting more—like money. And then the whole press corps, the whole true-blue, all-American concept of a free press, is undermined and prostituted and "way of life" and everything else that a "patriot" who sells himself to the CIA might claim to uphold is lost.

So I told this unnamed guy that I thought the CIA should clear the names of the vast majority of American correspondents by releasing the names of those who were "agents." He didn't want me to quote him, but he did let out a big laugh. "Ha, ha, ha."

HUMAN EVENTS
22 Dec. 1973

What's The Story Behind the CIA and Newsmen Abroad?

In one of the more remarkable breaches of intelligence service ethics, Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby established, if nothing else, his amateur standing by ordering a review of 40 full-time American journalists abroad who have also acted for the CIA, being paid for their services.

This was previously front-paged by the *New York Times*, which reported that no regular staff correspondent of major daily newspapers with regular overseas bureaus were involved, and "no more than five are full-time correspondents with general circulation news coverage."

Quite apparently, the supposed breach of ethics is in the American newsmen accepting money from their own government; gaining information from foreign sources and giving it to the CIA is not unethical. It is plain that the CIA means to continue to follow this practice of swapping information with un-

paid sources.

Nothing more crippling to an intelligence service can be imagined than "breaking the cover" of an agent it recruits into its service. Among other things, it might well cost the agent his life. For a second consideration, no professional worth his salt will deal with an organization which does not protect his cover.

In breaking this blanket cover, the greatest disservice has been done our country. However, it is nothing new. Congress has been doing it for some time.

Such exposure, moreover, is a farce. This is because most of the foreign news agencies controlled by their governments operating in Washington are thereby disguised intelligence operations—fully protected by American freedom of the press.

They roam Washington, asking questions which their embassies cannot; and form close relationships with key people. Actually, American security is so bad that some of our key military secrets have been printed in our public press, as for example, the hull designs of our atomic subs and the fact that we could track Russian subs.

But, having made donkeys of ourselves by publicly admitting the use of a paltry 40 stringers abroad, another question arises. To what extent have the Communists and the British, for example, penetrated our great dailies and news services?

In the past, they have penetrated the highest places. Walter Lippmann's secretary was revealed to have the sharpest Communist connections: a Communist wormed himself into the late Drew Pearson's staff. How close was Hanoi to the sympathetic mercies of the U.S. press?

Certainly, the *New York Times* is not

17 DEC 1973

Communist, but Fidel Castro won its confidence to the point that the *Times* assured the nation that Castro wasn't Communist either.

Certain it is also that time and time again, the U.S. press and the U.S. Congress informed Hanoi in advance of American troop movements, weaponry and objectives.

According to one commanding general to which this reporter has spoken, CBS-faked Vietnam news was a scandal. In any event, we cannot help but note that it would be a triumph for any foreign intelligence officer to get the head of CIA and U.S. newspapers to expose the CIA newspaper apparatus operating abroad.

Wouldn't it be interesting, now, if CIA revealed how the foreign intelligence systems are operating in the United States?

It is to be noted, of course, that the best of all foreign agents are those in high places who do not realize that they are being used. "Nothing is more useful," said Nikolai Lenin, "than a useful idiot." In diplomacy, idiots are called "innocents." The history of U.S. diplomats—and some of the press—for the past 25 years has been "innocents abroad."

North American Newspaper Alliance

WASHINGTON STAR
19-DEC 1973

Letters to the Editor

'Reporters as Spies'

SIR: I was amazed to read Oswald Johnston's article about American journalists doubling as CIA contacts.

Could it be true that there are three dozen American journalists who can be considered loyal enough to their country and its well-being that they would be employed by the CIA? After reading Washington newspapers for the past 20 years, I can't believe that there could be 36 people in the news field who would consider helping their country instead of dragging it over the coals incessantly as is the practice of the great majority of the correspondents in this area.

It is my deep belief that most newsmen will stop at nothing to get a story. Example: A *Star-News* article about possible CIA activities in Russia. Have the editors thought of the consequences to American agents behind the Iron Curtain as a result of such a story? Their lives are certainly worth more than a news item. Do newsmen ever consider the morality of using informants and underhanded methods to achieve their goals; or is there a double standard in which the process is wrong only when used by their opponents—namely, government agents or agencies?

You assure the American people that in local

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17 DEC 1973

Unlikely at best Newsmen spies?

By DONALD R. MORRIS
Post News Analyst

A recent news story claims that 30 or 40 American newsmen are CIA agents, and that at least five of them are staff employees of a major wire service, a syndicate or a specific newspaper.

Editorial comment was brisk, with the usual outraged indignation interspersed by rumblings from various quarters that any reporter found moonlighting for the CIA would shortly be an ex-reporter.

The exact nature of the sensitivity was not spelled out, but obviously stemmed from a fear that a connection with the CIA would somehow corrupt the writer's copy. This would take the form of a covert effort by the CIA to plant or influence stories in the domestic media, and in the absence of any known method of proving it does not do so, the CIA must live with what is a natural and lively anxiety.

In point of fact, the Agency is forbidden by law to tangle with the domestic media (although not with foreign media), and several promising black propaganda operations over the years have been abandoned because they were picked up by the domestic press. It is difficult—if not impossible—to convince the public, but the outlines of most such covert activities abroad are known to a wide circle of officials, including numerous members of both houses of Congress, and there would be immediate repercussions if the Agency ever sailed over the line.

In further point of fact, the Agency itself has barred agent recruitments among numer-

ous categories, for obvious reasons. These include clerics of all descriptions, Red Cross workers, Peace Corps personnel, Fulbright scholars—and American journalists. The flap potential in using such agents far outweighs any utility the agent might have.

Tradecraft literature makes heavy use of "foreign correspondents" for its protagonists, there being something inordinately dramatic in their public image. They are, actually, of remarkably little use in clandestine operations. Covert collection depends on recruiting someone who has completely natural access to the information you are after—newsmen abroad are highly conspicuous and do not have "natural" access. They must push for their interviews, and when they get them they are in an overt information-gathering role.

In most countries, moreover, American newsmen do not have access to figures American officials do not have access to themselves, and in either event the figure being interviewed knows he is talking "for the record." He is, if anything, more apt to let his hair down with a colleague than he is for a reporter whose object is to publish the interview. There is, therefore, very little that the newsmen can do for the intelligence community in his professional capacity. What utility he might have stems from his presence as an American abroad, which would permit him to perform such support functions as engineering introductions or providing background information about his contacts—and such tasks can be performed by other support agents.

CIA-journalist contacts, the integrity of neither the *Star-News* nor its correspondent was compromised. There are those of us who would worry more whether the integrity of the CIA agent had been compromised by such a contact.

Sally B. Erwin.

* * * *

SIR: Reporter Johnston has joined the growing ranks of our best investigative reporters.

By revealing massive CIA subversion of our free press, Johnston may also have identified the "leaks" that eluded the "Plumbers."

President Nixon told us last May that "leaks of secret information" relating to any one of "a number of highly sensitive foreign policy initiatives . . . could endanger all." This appeared to mean he wished newsmen to rely exclusively on policy officials and official news offices for their information on foreign affairs.

Johnston now tells us about "the quiet, informal relationship" between CIA officials and "many reporters working at home and abroad and editors who for their part maintain regular contact with CIA officials in the routine performance of their journalistic duties."

Further investigative reporting in this area might embarrass many individuals, but it might illuminate how all the news media have been exploited by dirty tricksters and purveyors of raw, unevaluated "intelligence."

This might also force the press to cease identifying their CIA sources in their articles as "Department of State officials."

John J. Harter.

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SIR: Your editorial, "Reporters as Spies" asserted that if "there are trade publications which do not object to the recruiting of their overseas writers (by the CIA), that is their business and no concern of ours."

This seems to imply a double standard of reportorial integrity — a high level one for press associations and daily newspapers and a low level, or none at all, for trade publications.

In some 40 years of reporting and writing for trade publications, as well as daily newspapers, I was never aware that trade publications demanded less integrity. It seems to me the *Star-News* would better serve the cause of decent journalism if it would condemn all reportorial duplicity, not merely that which involves one class of publications.

And, how about the *Star-News*' own Jerry O'Leary and the CIA? Your explanation of that wasn't very convincing.

Stephens Rippey.

* * * *

SIR: When the lead editorial in a major metropolitan daily has as its topic some aspect of journalism, one expects that here, at least, the author is well-informed on his subject. It was therefore, with growing amazement and even disbelief that I read "Reporters as Spies".

Surely you are aware that many, if not most, "stringers" or "freelance" correspondents are part-time writers and depend for their living upon some other full-time job. I have always thought

NEW YORK POST

19 December 1973

James A. Wechsler

CIA's SECRET PRESS AGENTS

It has long been an open secret in the newspaper fraternity that the Central Intelligence Agency was providing clandestine subsidy for a number of needy or greedy American journalists laboring in foreign lands. Such men (and women) were pledged, of course, to the secret rituals of the agency; moreover, in most cases, their home-office employers would have taken a dim view of these CIA connections.

One result of this condition was that some wholly innocent characters fell under suspicion when their life-styles became conspicuously affluent. Sometimes they were the beneficiaries of the care and feeding of wealthy ladies in the countries to which they were assigned; being gentlemen of the Fourth Estate, they were naturally unprepared to reveal how they had suddenly raised their standards of living.

But others were indeed CIA agents, and occasionally their patterns of behavior left little doubt about their undercover assignments. Nevertheless, it was only recently that CIA director William Colby, after reviewing the agency's press network, admittedly found that some 40 full-time correspondents, free-lancers and representatives of trade publications were also CIA hands regularly remunerated for their services.

When word of these findings leaked out, stirring negative noises in the media, Colby announced that he would reorganize the structure. He should have buried it.

Under the new CIA formula, the agency will gradually dispense with the aid of full-time correspondents working for general circulation news-gathering organizations. But it will continue to subsidize some 30 characters who use the cover of free-lance magazine writers, newspaper "stringers" (contributors paid for individual dispatches to publications and news services) and roaming authors. It will also retain eight writers employed by specialized periodicals, including trade journals, most of whose "moonlighting" activities are known to their editors.

While the revised setup will reduce the amount of filth in which journalism is an accomplice, it will not eliminate the disease. Nor will it undo the damage inflicted on the whole profession of foreign correspondence by official confirmation that so many have been tainted by this tie-up.

Some papers and agencies with large foreign staffs have taken pains to obtain—and publish—assurances from Colby that none of their writers are or have been on the

that material submitted by free-lance correspondents was accepted or rejected on such bases as accuracy, timeliness, and quality of writing. Now you would have me believe that it is equally important that the correspondent not be a CIA agent, or presumably a pimp, pusher, or bank robber, or have some other such unsavory primary method of earning his livelihood.

The full-time CIA agent overseas is a Civil Service employee, and his pay and allowances are therefore none too generous considering the risks he takes and the time and effort he puts in on the job. If in the course of this activity he learns things of interest to the American public, and if he has the time, talent, and energy to write about them well, on time and accurately, why should he not earn a few extra dollars by doing so?

Considering the heavy emphasis the CIA places on "security" I would expect it to be CIA Director Colby, not the press, who would object to "spies as reporters."

Joseph M. Struve.

Bowie, Md.

* * * *

SIR: The American people can only benefit from the perception and courage demonstrated by the *Star-News* in unmasking CIA manipulation of the press.

The long-term benefits will be measureable by the CIA response to your injunction to "go further" in de-penetrating the media.

John J. Harter.

CIA payroll. But such isolated testimonials of purity do not clear the air. Probably nothing less than a full Congressional inquiry that firmly established the scope of the practice and identified the participants could achieve that.

* * * *

I recognize there are moral problems in obliging the agency to embarrass some who accepted its largesse in what they considered to be good faith—or even viewed themselves as a breed of superpatriot. That they deceived their editors and readers and compromised elementary journalistic principle may be called part of the price we all are paying for the catch-all defense of "national security" too long tolerated in many areas of the media. But it is a very high price.

In any case, minimal redress for this shabby era requires total abandonment of any CIA use of journalism as an umbrella for its business.

I do not know how much valuable data, as distinct from barroom and latrine gossip, was accumulated by the CIA emissaries disguised as newsmen. Whatever goodies may have been acquired during peak seasons of the cloak-and-dagger industry, it could not have been worth the dishonor it has brought to those who have any standards about the role of an independent press in a free society.

If this sounds like lofty talk, it is written at a time when journalists are freely accepting plaudits for distinguished service in exposing venality and fraud in high places. In such a period there is a special responsibility to react with some spirit when corrupt practices are unfolded in our own vineyard.

The CIA has sometimes been the object of unjust attack and cheap shots; it was one of J. Edgar Hoover's favorite targets because he instinctively regarded any intelligence system other than his own with jealous contempt—even when it was ostensibly restricted to overseas activity. Actually, under former director Richard Helms, the CIA is now recognized to have made far more realistic assessments about the war in Vietnam, for example, than did other governmental units. Conceivably some of its paid correspondents helped to shape the judgments.

Even if the latter point could be sustained, the investment remains indefensible. As long as any phase of the undercover funding for journalists goes on, there will be a residue of doubt and distrust—just as the magazine *Encounter* was shadowed by reports of CIA subsidy.

* * *

One need have no naivete about the durability of detente or the hazards of the future to insist there are certain disadvantages a democracy must accept in contests with totalitarianism. One is that its journalists do not allow themselves to become covert hired hands of government—or industry or labor—while professing to write as free men.

WASHINGTON POST
22 December 1973

Things Stir in Pentagon Under Unconventional Schlesinger

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

The blue and white Air Force jet waited at the Brussels airport last week for its VIP passenger to arrive—Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger.

Then, the wet-footed, red-eared bird watcher wrapped in tattered old corduroys and sweater boarded the plane.

The Pentagon's civilian boss has been unwinding from a two-day North Atlantic Treaty Organization meeting by spending his last hours in Belgium bird watching in the cold, coastal marshlands.

For Schlesinger, who took over the top Pentagon post in May, bird watching is an old hobby. But for military men, civilian bureaucrats, NATO ministers and Kremlin planners, Schlesinger-watching has become increasingly interesting and important.

As a Cabinet officer, the 44-year-old pipe-smoking defense intellectual, whose shirt tail is out more than it's in, seems to be living up to his billing as an unconventional bureaucrat.

During his short tour earlier this year as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Harvard-trained (Ph.D. in economics) went through the CIA's old-boy network with a broom—chucked him by the White House—that swept about 1,000 people out of the agency's "fired bureaucracy." Earlier, as head of the Atomic Energy Commission, he had taken his wife and two of their eight children to the Aleutian Islands to demonstrate that a big and controversial underground nuclear weapons test there was safe.

His presence in the Pentagon has caused things to stir there, too, though it isn't clear yet just how bold a Defense Secretary he plans to be.

Civilians in the vast Defense Department bureaucracy are worried about a CIA-style purge falling on them.

The military is worried because Schlesinger, though generally hawkish, is unpredictable and knows more about strategy, technology and probably history than his civilian predecessors in the Pentagon's E-ring.

In Europe, he has succeeded rather quickly in at least gaining the attention and respect of the NATO defense ministers, who have lots of problems of their own.

Schlesinger believes strongly that a large U.S. military pull out from Europe would be a disaster for both American and European interests. In the context of an \$85 billion defense budget, he does not believe that a U.S. balance of payments deficit from overseas basing of perhaps \$1.5 billion currently estimated should dictate policy on such an important matter.

Yet, he has warned the Europeans—with logic and with some convenient help from Congress—that unless they "get serious" about improving their own defenses in a rational manner and stop exaggerating their own weaknesses and Communist-bloc strengths, the forces in this country demanding an American withdrawal will become irresistible.

Schlesinger has skillfully enlisted the aid of U.S. commanders in carrying to their European counterparts this previously painful message: He knows that for the U.S. Army, for example, Europe has always been the only place where the front lines seem real, with the Warsaw Pact forces just 80 miles across the Elbe River.

In Moscow, and indeed in Washington, the small but influential group of planners and critics who follow the arcane world of nuclear weapons and strategy are also paying close attention to the new Pentagon chief.

Schlesinger's career had been steeped in atomic strategy since he first joined the Rand Corp. think tank staff in 1963. In recent weeks, he has been suggesting openly that the United States may indeed be moving toward a new, controversial and potentially expensive shift away from the nuclear policies that have prevailed for a decade.

In simple terms, what Schlesinger is saying is this:

Since the early 1960s, American nuclear strategy has been based on what is called "mutual assured destruction," euphemistically known as MAD. It entails having the ability to destroy enough Soviet cities and in-

ustrial centers, even after absorbing a surprise first strike, to deter any such attack.

But Schlesinger, and others now in office, maintain that MAD was never really a strategy, but rather a way to measure the size of the U.S. arsenal and how much damage it could do.

In his view, if the Soviet missile force—through the eventual addition of large and accurate multiple warheads to their current missiles—gets big enough to eventually knock out a portion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in less than an all-out attack, it is no good just to have the ability to hit Soviet cities in return. The United States would know that American cities would then be destroyed in a second volley.

Schlesinger believes such a U.S. strategy is not credible in Russian eyes, nor even for that matter to most West European leaders.

Unless the multiple-warhead race is curbed through negotiations, Schlesinger wants the United States to have the ability to respond at least "selectively" against Russian military targets—presumably such things as certain large missile silos, underground control centers, command posts, missile storage depots and field headquarters—in a tit-for-tat basis short of holocaust.

In the past, even hints of such a shift brewing in the Pentagon have touched off criticism from some members of Congress who oppose new developments that could possibly touch off a new round in the arms race.

Yet, though Schlesinger has been saying some of these things publicly for several weeks now, Congress has not asked for answers to many of the questions such a shift would raise.

It is not clear, for example, how such a shift would be accomplished. The United States already has thousands of MIRV-type multiple warheads, and hard to knock out military targets can be demolished by simply directing more of the existing force against them. Some work is already being done to allow quick re-targeting of a missile's electronic brain.

But this task, the military will argue, can also be done

more efficiently and safely with new weapons, while leaving the old ones intact to carry out their current jobs. This, of course, could be enormously expensive and could also run the risk of misinterpretation by the Soviet Union and of a still larger new round in the arms race.

There are also other questions to ask: How would such a piecemeal nuclear war unfold? Is there anything in the world so important to Soviet national interests that would cause the Russians to launch less than an all-out attack on the United States, and gamble that its cities would not be destroyed in return?

Schlesinger is also reviewing the strategy and hardware of so-called "tactical" nuclear warfare in Europe.

At a NATO meeting earlier this year, officials say the United States discussed the "option" of removing some of the bigger 750-kiloton tactical atomic bombs now in Europe and replacing them with new "mini-nukes" that have been developed but not produced.

These are smaller atomic warheads for artillery pieces such as the 155-mm., 175-mm. and howitzers. One official says you can "Sort of dial-a-yield" to keep the explosion small, and that the weapons are "cleaner," meaning the effects of radioactive fallout are reduced.

Critics argue that the mini-nukes are very dangerous in that they lower the threshold at which conventional war becomes nuclear and will make it easier to decide upon their use.

But Schlesinger privately maintains, his aides say, that it can also be argued that such weapons could carry the signal of escalation to the Soviet Union in the hope of stopping a war, without creating atomic havoc in Europe by use of larger weapons.

For the moment, Congress has made the argument moot by refusing to authorize production. But under Schlesinger, the question is almost certain to be revived.

By instinct and training, Schlesinger is at home dealing with questions of European security and nuclear strategy. But the U.S. defense establishment is troubled by even deeper prob-

NEW YORK TIMES

25 DEC 1973

Schlesinger's Impact on the Pentagon Is Yet to Be Felt

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 24—When James R. Schlesinger took over as Secretary of Defense last July, Senator Stuart Symington, who as the first Air Force Secretary and then as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee has seen Defense Secretaries come and go, gave him a bit of fatherly advice.

"Every Secretary of Defense—and I have known them all—eventually fell under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," the Missouri Democrat told the 44-year-old economist.

"Don't let it happen to you."

"You just wait and see," Mr. Schlesinger responded with a note of self-confidence typical of a man who in a few years has risen step by step, from assistant director of the Office of Management and Budget to head a military establishment that is spending \$79-billion annually and wants to spend more.

After nearly six months, both Congressional observers and the military chiefs are still waiting to see which way the new Defense Secretary will go, both in his direction of the Pentagon as well as in post-Vietnam military policy.

Little Visible Impact

Thus far, Mr. Schlesinger has had little visible impact on either defense policy or the military budget, somewhat to the surprise of the Pentagon bureaucracy, which had been forewarned of his reputation as an impersonal, almost professorial administrator who, after leaving his budget post, shook up first the Atomic Commission and then the Central Intelligence Agency.

"I think he is still casing the joint," said one Congressional observer who is in almost daily contact with Mr. Schlesinger.

However, certain clues are emerging as to the direction he will take. They all seem to indicate that, while he may not fall under the domination of the Joint Chiefs, his strategic policy will not be basically different from theirs.

There also are mounting signs that Mr. Schlesinger, if he has his way, will be the architect of a major redesign of a nuclear strategic policy that has prevailed since the nineteen-fifties of expenditures by all Government agencies while social and economic, which all started with the Eisenhower-Dulles doctrine of massive retaliation, Mr.

Schlesinger, with support from the military chiefs, wants to add a significant new element, known as a counterforce strategy. Under this strategy, the United States would also aim for the capability to fight a nuclear war short of an all-out exchange with the Soviet Union.

The first concrete sign of his policies will come in the new defense budget in January. That budget has now been virtually completed by Mr. Schlesinger, and present indications are that it will call for defense spending in the coming fiscal year of around \$85-billion, or a \$6-billion rise over the current fiscal year.

Such an anticipated rise indicates that he does not believe the defense budget can or should be cut, in which the military chiefs emphatically agree.

Taking inflation into consideration, a hold-the-line defense budget for the coming fiscal year would total around \$83-billion. To this he wants to add \$2-billion to \$3-billion for what he likes to call "flexibility," in part to start development of counter-force weapons.

In contrast to Melvin R. Laird, who let the military chiefs split up the defense budget and then added enough fat so that Congressional committees could boast about how they had cut it, Mr. Schlesinger has followed a more analytical approach, one that would be expected of a man who once served as the chief strategic thinker at the Rand Corporation, the Air Force's "think tank."

6 Per Cent of G.N.P.

His professorial approach also shows up in the colored charts that he takes around to Congressional offices, all seeking to demonstrate that despite the rising defense budget, military spending is taking only 6 per cent of the gross national product, that in terms of purchasing power the defense budget is at the lowest level since the early nineteen-fifties, and that in terms of a major redesign of a nuclear national priorities, defense spending is down to 18 per cent of the defense budget.

The question remains, however, whether Mr. Schlesinger is really trying to change the direction of the military estab-

lishment since basically his objectives do not seem to differ from the policy tenets of the military.

One of his basic principles is that after all the reductions since the Vietnam peak in 1968, no further cuts can be made in the present military force structure, although he holds out the possibility of reducing support forces, which he concedes are bloated, and closing some military bases.

He firmly believes in retaining and revitalizing the Atlantic Alliance, which he feels represents the linchpin of American military policy. To him this means the United States must retain troops in Europe indefinitely.

On strategic doctrine, he rejects the past concept of sufficiency, which is built on the premise that even if the Soviet Union is superior in some areas of strategic weapons, it is sufficient for the United States to have a strategic arsenal capable of retaliating with devastating effect upon the Soviet Union. He believes that any long-term balance must rest on basic equality of strategic weapons between the two nations.

Fears Goal of Superiority

He is suspicious that the Soviet Union is attempting to achieve nuclear superiority. For that reason he believes the United States must start the development of a new generation of bigger, more accurate missiles as a hedge against the failure of the strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union.

Similar Objectives

Mr. Schlesinger's contacts with President Nixon have been far less frequent than those of Mr. Kissinger. The Defense Secretary did meet with the President last week to discuss the military budget for the next fiscal year.

If Mr. Schlesinger has seemed to move cautiously, associates suggest that it is because he has discovered it is far more difficult to shake up the Defense Department than the smaller A.E.C. or C.I.A. Rather than lead a charge against an entrenched military establishment, they suggest, he has to order a retaliatory attack against Soviet cities if he knew of chosen to lay down some broad defense objectives and then attempt to nudge the military in those directions.

The question remains, however, whether Mr. Schlesinger's arsenal of counterforce weapons is capable of attacking Soviet military installations.

lems—everything from soaring personnel and weapons costs, to poor morale, lingering racial problems and congressional pork-barreling with favorite local defense programs.

Whether Schlesinger will dive into this broader collection of ills remains to be seen.

NEW YORK TIMES
24 December 1973

Nixon Role in Foreign Policy Is Altered; Some Assert Kissinger Is Now in Charge

By LESLIE H. GELB
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 23—Profound changes have taken place in the way foreign policy is made in the Nixon Administration in the wake of the Watergate scandals and the appointment of Henry A. Kissinger as Secretary of State.

First, the elaborate National Security Council system of making decisions by presenting the President with the facts and the options, so that he is not at the mercy of the bureaucracy, has become less important. The formal committee apparatus of the National Security Council remains intact, but the council itself has not met since Mr. Kissinger became Secretary Sept. 21, and it met only twice before that this year.

A Disputed Interpretation

Second, the President is playing an altered and, some say, a lesser role in the formulation of national security policy.

The effect of the changes, according to a wide variety of senior officials in the State and Defense Departments and in Congress, is that Secretary Kissinger and not President Nixon is running foreign affairs and that the Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, has been left in charge of military affairs.

On the other hand, White House officials, in interviews with The New York Times, have said the conjectures along these lines are politically motivated nonsense aimed at trying to get the President. They say they come from people who do not know what they are talking about.

"Henry receives and requests instructions from the President before he acts on any issue of importance," one of them said. According to the officials only the President, Mr. Kissinger and Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., the President's chief of staff, know exactly how decisions are made.

The White House officials conceded nevertheless, that Mr. Nixon had decentralized national security decision-making. One described the new situation this way: "Given the pros we have in the top jobs now, we can do with a nod what used to take three hours of discussion."

Mr. Nixon's relationship with his two principal subordinates has become a matter of constant speculation in the bureaucracy and on Capitol Hill. Some Senators and other right-

ing officials say they have gotten the impression that Mr. Kissinger is now making most of the decisions himself. What annoys the White House most is gossip in the bureaucracy that what is happening is the equivalent of President Lyndon B. Johnson's decision-making "Tuesday lunches"—only now they are held without the President.

The situation is believed to have arisen because the President's time is consumed by Watergate and other troubles, allowing Mr. Kissinger to "take over."

The White House, asked to provide data on the frequency and length of meetings between the President and his Secretary of State, produced the following cumulative table, covering the period Sept. 1 to Dec. 7:

Days in same locality 45

Number of meetings 92

Telephone conversations 30

Days separated 53

Telephone conversations 38

High Frequency Seen

Present and former officials said the figures represented a high frequency of contact between a President and a Cabinet officer.

High foreign-policy officials described the President and Mr. Kissinger as dealing with their new situation on a tentative basis. But in the meantime the following patterns seem to be emerging:

Mr. Kissinger is occasionally using his committee apparatus, which he still controls as assistant to the President, to keep his hands on defense issues and to circumvent the State Department bureaucracy, which has become his own.

The National Security Council staff, so powerful in the early days of the Administration, is losing influence to intimates whom Mr. Kissinger took with him to the State Department and to those in the Pentagon who are favored by Secretary Schlesinger.

A looser, more informal system for making key decisions is developing between Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Schlesinger at their "Tuesday lunches," which sometimes occur on Thursdays and sometimes at breakfast.

Three Broad Questions

Three broad questions were asked in the interviews with officials of the White House, the Defense and State Departments, Congress and the N.S.C. staff: What has happened to the formal National Security Council system? How are decisions really being made? How does the Nixon-Kissinger-Schlesinger relationship work?

The National Security Council was established by Congress in 1947 as the key advisory panel to the President on foreign and defense policy. Its statutory members are now the President, Vice President, Sec-

retary of State and Defense Secretary. Statutory advisers to the council are the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, now Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, and the Director of Central Intelligence, now William C. Colby.

Other important figures currently involved in the business of the council are General Haig and Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Mr. Kissinger's deputy on the council staff. On occasion in the past, Attorneys General such as Robert F. Kennedy and John N. Mitchell as well as Secretaries of the Treasury have attended meetings.

Of the Presidents preceding Mr. Nixon, only Dwight D. Eisenhower held fairly regular meetings. The others—Harry S. Truman, John F. Kennedy and Mr. Johnson, as well as General Eisenhower—basically used the aura that quickly developed about the council to legitimize certain policies that had been worked out in less formal circumstances.

Making Apparent Real

In 1969 President Nixon promised to make the apparent real. On Feb. 7, 1969, the White House announced: "The President indicated that the council will henceforth be the principal forum for the consideration of policy issues."

That year 37 council meetings were called. The number rapidly dwindled to three in 1972 and the two so far in 1973.

In the Hotel Pierre in New York before his inauguration, President-elect Nixon and Mr. Kissinger, who had been designated as his assistant for national security affairs, devised a new system of interagency committees. It was much more elaborate and intricate than the relatively informal system inherited from President John-

son.

All but one of the committees that report directly to the National Security Council are presided over by Mr. Kissinger in his capacity as assistant to the President. The membership of the committees is identical: Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements Jr., Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush, Mr. Colby of the C.I.A. and Admiral Moorer. Mr. Rush heads the under secretaries' committee.

Assistant secretaries of state preside over the interdepartmental and ad hoc groups. They are charged with carrying out the interagency staff work according to national security study memorandums, or NSSM's (insiders pronounce the term Nissims) issued by the President.

In the first four and three-quarter years of the Nixon Administration, some 200 memos were issued. In the three months since Mr. Kissinger has been at the State Department,

only four have been issued for Decision Memorandums.

Once the staff studies are completed and reviewed by the first-tier committees, they are forwarded to the council. The President then releases a National Security Decision Memorandum.

A typical NSSM might deal with United States policy toward Thailand, presenting the background and the problems and offering three or four alternative courses of action. In the decision memo the President would state that he had chosen and direct that action be taken by the C.I.A., the Pentagon or an embassy.

The purpose of the system as described in a 1970 letter from Mr. Kissinger to Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, was to present the President with "distinct options, together with their pros and cons and implications and costs, rather than a single policy recommendation founded on bureaucratic consensus."

Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger, according to those who helped them construct the system, were really worried about the bureaucracy. They saw it as basically peopled by hostile Democrats and tied to vested interests.

Mr. Kissinger was to create at the White House one of the most powerful staffs in Washington. That staff was to protect the President against State Department, which was viewed as representing "foreign" interests; against the Pentagon, which was seen as an insatiable consumer of military hardware, and against an intelligence community that rarely saw evil intentions on the part of Moscow and Peking.

A Trickle of Memos

But in recent months, the council has stopped meeting, the memos have dwindled to a trickle and Mr. Kissinger has begun to carry off to the State Department his most trusted aides on the N.S.C. staff.

Former and present council staff members believe that sometimes the system did work to give the President the facts and real options, rather than a phony "consensus option."

Senior military officers, in particular, were said to be unhappy; they had regarded the system as an institutionalized channel for presenting military views on policy matters. "It's virtually impossible to get our views to Kissinger now," one said.

System Termned Alive

The White House officials disagreed. They did not think the system was dead. They maintained that when General Haig accepted H. R. Haldeman's job as chief of staff at the White House, he proposed that the system be decentralized, and that the President readily agreed.

They said the President decided that "we can do business in more efficient, less formal ways." One of them added: "These guys know the

scope, and they know the issues backwards and forwards, but the President still runs the show."

According to the White House sources, Mr. Kissinger has an interest in perpetuating some functions of the National Security Council system since it allows him to do things that a Secretary of State cannot do.

For example, Mr. Kissinger has told many people privately that his main reason for retaining his N.S.C. job is to keep an eye on the defense budget. The defense analysis section of the staff has remained active. However, Mr. Kissinger is not known to have urged a reduction in the over-all level of military spending in the last five years.

The White House officials also acknowledged that Mr. Kissinger had used the council staff to circumvent his subordinates at the State Department. During the recent Arab-Israeli war, he sent messages to Middle Eastern heads of state through the Central Intelligence Agency communications facilities at the White House.

The messages were drafted by the council staff, and high State Department officials were unaware of them. They were sent directly to C.I.A. field offices.

Mr. Kissinger also reportedly continues to use C.I.A. channels to transmit messages to Moscow and Peking. These "back-channel" activities persist despite his pledge before becoming Secretary to involve the State Department experts fully in their areas of specialization.

Meanwhile, according to Foreign Service officers, Mr. Kissinger's close associates from the N.S.C.—Winston Lord, Lawrence S. Eagleburger and Helmut Sonnenfeldt—are already wielding tremendous influence in Foggy Bottom.

At the Pentagon, officials said Mr. Schlesinger was also relying on particular individuals rather than a general staff rebuilding process. He seems to favor his special assistants and military assistants along with isolated experts, regardless of rank, they said.

This emphasis on key people and personal relationships

rather than committees—not so different from previous Administrations—extends to the top of the ladder, to the Kissinger-Schlesinger relationship.

White House officials have explained, without prompting, that Mr. Kissinger was urged to establish cordial contacts with Mr. Schlesinger because of his poor relations with the previous Secretaries of Defense, Melvin R. Laird and Elliot L. Richardson. One man said Mr. Richardson was particularly miffed at Mr. Kissinger because he had regular lunches with Mr. Clements as a way of working around Mr. Richardson.

Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Schlesinger try to see each other for lunch or breakfast once a week and talk on the telephone frequently, according to Defense and State Department officials. These sources said that the important business gets done then. White House sources, on the other hand, said they were only "bull sessions."

At the same time, they acknowledged that the President's

decentralization edict allowed the new Secretaries more scope than their predecessors had.

One White House official discussing the idea that Mr. Kissinger is "taking over," said: "I know, I know, it's Henry's style. He makes it sound as if he's in charge." Another nodded, saying, "Henry just overwhelms them."

These officials vigorously insist that the speculation is malicious gossip, emanating from people who do not know the facts and who are out to take away the President's strong suit in foreign affairs.

The officials emphasized that Mr. Kissinger attended almost every 8:30 A.M. staff meeting with the President, and then saw him alone later in the morning before leaving for the State Department. They said the two men also talked on the telephone almost daily.

Secretary Schlesinger does not enjoy the same access to the President. White House sources confirmed that he has not seen the President alone since going to the Pentagon.

WASHINGTON POST
15 December 1973

William S. White

Kissinger's Awesome Power

Granted that the phrase may sound as frivolous as the title of an Alfred Hitchcock thriller, the trouble with Henry is far from amusing—and very far from the fault of Henry Kissinger.

Secretary of State Kissinger has reached that most dangerous of all high plateaus in a democratic society. He is becoming something close to the indispensable man in a political structure that resents and ultimately rejects indispensable men. The two hats he is wearing—the one as Secretary of State and the other as the operating head of the National Security Council and the President's powerful alter ego in the White House—create problems of a kind never before experienced.

Henry Kissinger can, in fact, become in his own person and being that ordinarily impersonal thing called a conflict of interest. For three powers with three often competing interests—the State Department, the Department of Defense and the intelligence apparatus—form the core of the National Security Council over which Henry Kissinger must preside.

As Secretary of State he ought primarily to concern himself with pushing State's views and aims. But as chief of the NSC, subject only to the ultimate

authority of the President himself, Henry Kissinger cannot safely downgrade the views and demands of the Pentagon or the intelligence community.

In-built here is the latent danger of a Kissinger divided within himself and ultimately of one of those high-bureaucratic "feuds" of which Washington is so fond between those charged with the physical defense of the country and those responsible for its diplomacy.

The danger of such a "feud" lies primarily between the State Department and the Pentagon, which are never going to see some kinds of crises in the same light. A "feud" could have broken out, to the nation's peril, in the recent renewal of war in the Mideast over the proper scope and tempo of American assistance to Israel.

That it did not break out was due to two things: While the Pentagon chieftains, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and Undersecretary Clements, are plenty tough when they must be, neither will flex his muscles except as the very last resort. Kissinger, for his part, is both more patient and more in-

tellectually tolerant than his "public image" would suggest.

Nevertheless, it was still necessary for the President himself to step in decisively before American military supplies got moving to the embattled Israelis.

The question of which side—Pentagon or Kissinger—was "dragging its feet" is a moving target and no attempt to answer it will be made by this columnist. Anyhow, it is peripheral to the central issue: Has too much power been thrust upon Henry Kissinger by a President so domestically embattled over Watergate? And has Henry Kissinger in consequence been spread too thin and is too much being asked of him?

The proper response seems to me in both cases to be "yes." The best single example is that in all his famous sorties overseas his best and brightest effort has been both his most recent and his less than successful. This was his brilliant essay at getting our Western Allies off our backs and onto some constructive projects with us—such, for example, as jointly doing something real to reduce the West's dependence on the oil sheiks.

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WASHINGTON STAR
Washington, D. C., Friday, Jan. 12

Did

Spies Find Military on Kissinger?

By

A secret White House leak of classified documents produced evidence that officials were spying on the press and the Nation's heads, top government sources said.

The sources said Kissinger's staff was given information concerning peace talks and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense Secretary Thomas H. Moorer.

They said the secret leak resulted from a desire to cut off the joint chiefs from information not dealing with the Vietnam peace talks and national policies and to keep them from透露ing to China.

MOORER issued a statement, his spokesman, calling the charge of Kissinger spying on White House staff "ridiculous."

The White House said it had no comment. One Nixon administration official denied the "leak" charge, but another Nixon administration official was "misleading."

But at least four sources in the security community confirmed that the secret leak of information from Kissinger's office to the press had been dealt with.

The report that Moorer was a "spy" within Kissinger's office when the secret operation surfaced in the White House of White House officials, was to be on grounds it would not be believed.

NIXON frequently referred to his national security adviser as "the spy" and some of his actions in the so-called Watergate scandal. But he has no desire to expand on his sufficient belief, a source from Republican congressional leaders that it would help his cause.

The uncovering of the secret leak, the effort apparently was made by the "plumbers," a White House security unit formed to hunt down and stop the leaks of classified information.

The plumbers unit, headed by James W. Krogh and James W. McCord, the services of which were later convicted in the Watergate case, included Howard Hunt, an ex-CIA agent.

Young, Krogh, and McCord, presidential advisers to Nixon, through whom the secret leak may have been made, were involved in the burglary of the office of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, treating Dr. Ellsberg as a traitor to the Pentagon papers. Both were found guilty to federal charges, but state charges against them were dropped.

WHILE IT has been known for some time that the plumbers worked on four projects, only three of them had been made public until today. The three were the leaks of U.S. position on the India-Pakistan dispute, the strategic arms limitations talks and the Pentagon papers.

The sources from several intelligence areas outside the Pentagon said the fourth operation was the discovery of military spying on Kissinger's operation.

The sources said the White House also discovered some covert intelligence operations outside the United States being conducted by Pentagon intelligence officials. They said the activities went beyond "the scope of the Defense Intelligence Agency's charter."

Those familiar with the case say it occurred when Kissinger decided early in the Nixon administration's first term to cut off the Joint Chiefs from some of the intelligence information previously available to them.

PENTAGON officials, one source said, became "not only suspicious but paranoid as hell." He explained there already was within the military establishment a paranoia resulting from public charges that the joint chiefs had badly advised former President Lyndon B. Johnson on his war policy.

"There was more skullduggery and more politics in the Joint Chiefs of Staff than in the Central Intelligence Agency and the FBI combined at that time," the source said.

To fill the gap of information, the sources said, the Pentagon apparently decided to duplicate some of the intelligence activities already being carried out by other agencies like the CIA. And this later resulted in an effort to gain access to National Security Council data that was not being passed to the Pentagon, they added.

The spy alleged to have passed the information was dismissed shortly after he was discovered. Moorer, however, remains in administration favor and reportedly is to be named to a third term as chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

New York Times
11 Jan. 1974

CANADIAN COUNCIL CALLED C.I.A. LINK

TV Program Says Part of
National Research Group
Works in Intelligence

TORONTO, Jan. 10 (Canadian Press) — The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation said last night that a branch of Canada's National Research Council in Ottawa was really an intelligence agency working closely with the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States.

The television program said the council's communication branch was Canada's secret intercepting and bugging agency both inside and outside Canada and worked directly with the National Security Agency, its kindred body in the United States. But it also has contacts with the C.I.A., whose Ottawa

chief, Cleveland Oram, works out of the United States Embassy, the program said.

It said that Harry Brandes, an intelligence inspector for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, worked in Washington under a diplomatic cover.

The program, the hour-long *Fifth Estate*, quoted Victor L. Marchetti, a former assistant to the deputy director of the C.I.A., as having said that Canadian intelligence officers had free access to the C.I.A., where an office was put aside for them.

The program also quoted Winslow Peck, a former intelligence officer for the National Security Agency, as having said that an agreement had been made among Britain, Australia, Canada and the United States to divide the world into areas in which each country's intelligence agency would monitor all communications.

The Canadian Government has responsibility for the polar regions and for "a certain part of Europe," Mr. Peck said. He added, however, that much more information flowed into

the United States than from, and that the United States has monitored all communications in Canada and in its embassies abroad.

Monitoring Charged

John D. Marks, former staff assistant to the United States State Department director of intelligence, said on the program that much of the equipment on the Distant Early Warning line in the Canadian north was not for detecting of attacks but for American monitoring of communications in the northern parts of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Peck said:

"Information from the three other countries in the agreement all comes to the United States but the United States does not totally reciprocate in passing all information on to the other powers."

Asked to comment on the program, Mr. Cram said in Ottawa only that he was "an assistant to the Ambassador and an officer in the political section."

Inspector Brandes, referring to the charge that he worked as part of Canada's intelligence contingent in Washington, said: "That's nonsense."

On the program, Thomas W. Braden, former special assistant to the director of the C.I.A., described the growth of the agency as a device for building anti-Communist fronts.

He told how it underwrote the creation of magazines and newspapers favorable to the United States, without the knowledge of those involved. He also referred to C.I.A. support of labor unions, and said "most of the money that the agency gave away in those days went to the American Federation of Labor and George Meany."

[In Washington, a C.I.A. spokesman, asked about the Canadian broadcast allegations, said today, "We have nothing to say on this matter."]

In Ottawa the Mounted Police said that Inspector Brandes acted in a liaison capacity with United States police and intelligence agencies. The United States had a Federal Bureau of Investigation official in its Ottawa embassy named Joe Marion, who acted in the same capacity in Canada.

Speaking of Inspector Brandes's work, the spokesman said he "liaises with agencies in Washington."

"When we have a need to liaise with an agency in the United States in the intelligence field he's the man with the responsibility to do it," the spokesman said.

He said the Canadian police here dealt only through Mr. Marion and had no liaison with any other official of the United States Embassy.

LOS ANGELES TIMES

15 DEC 1973

Threat From Spying Increasing, FBI Says

Annual Report Attributes Growth to Rise in Number of Soviet-Bloc Officials in U.S.

BY RONALD J. OSTROW

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — Despite the diplomatic thaw between the United States and Soviet-bloc nations, the FBI said Friday that the threat from Communist spying in the United States was increasing.

"The threat to the United States and the counter-intelligence responsibilities of the FBI have been growing in proportion to the Soviet-bloc presence" here, the bureau said in its annual report.

Soviet-bloc officials stationed in this country numbered 1,296 last July 1, a 41% increase over the last five years, the report said.

"FEI counterintelligence operations continue to identify a high and fairly consistent percentage of Soviet-bloc personnel in the United States as intelligence officers or agents," the bureau said.

An FBI spokesman declined to estimate how many of the officials have been identified as agents. "In that area, we're limited to what we put in the report," which covers the fiscal year that ended last June 30, he said.

FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley, describing fiscal 1973 as "one of the most trying eras in the FBI's history," nevertheless took issue with those who contend that the Watergate case "and other adversities" have undermined the agency's effectiveness, integrity or morale.

"Those who have such doubts underestimate the character of career FBI employees," Kelley said. The 56-page report in-

cluded only one reference to L. Patrick Gray III, who resigned as acting director of the bureau in April after it was disclosed that he had burned material removed from the desk of a former White House consultant convicted in the Watergate case.

But the annual review did take note of some of the innovations Gray introduced. These included establishment of an office to attract minorities to FBI ranks and dropping the barrier to women agents. Fifteen women had completed training and were assigned to field offices by June 30, and nine more were undergoing training then, according to the report.

In other areas of FBI activity, the report said:

—Since the 1972 passage of a law protecting foreign officials and guests, the bureau has received four or five reports a week on incidents "with subversive ramifications" involving foreign missions or personnel.

—The number of finger-print cards received from law enforcement agencies across the country dropped in fiscal 1973 because the FBI is no longer accepting prints taken in connection with minor offenses, such as drunkenness, traffic violations and loitering.

—The new FBI building, now under construction in Washington, is expected to be ready for occupancy next July. The structure, across Pennsylvania Ave. from the Department of Justice, will house 7,700 FBI employees and all headquarters operations.